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Do Parties to Nuisance Cases Bargain After
Judgment? A Glimpse Inside the Cathedral
Ward Farnswortht
Economic analysts of remedies often use nuisance cases as examples to illustrate their
models. The illustrations commonly suppose that parties to such cases will be interested in
bargaining after judgment if the court fails to award the rights to the party willing to pay
the most for them. Professor Farnsworth examines twenty nuisance cases and finds no bar-
gaining after judgment in any of them; nor did the parties' lawyers believe that bargaining
would have occurred ifjudgment had been given to the loser. The lawyers said that the pos-
sibility of such bargaining was foreclosed not by the sorts of transaction costs that usually
are the subject of economic models, but by animosity between the parties and by their dis-
taste for cash bargaining over the rights at issue. Professor Farnsworth suggests that these
results raise a number of interesting questions, such as how the obstacles to bargaining in
these cases might be related to the absence of markets for the rights at stake, whether ani-
mosity or a distaste for bargaining should be considered transaction costs, and whether
greater particularity might be needed before economic models can generate advice about
remedies reliable enough to be useful to courts.
INTRODUCTION
For about as long as there has been economic analysis of law,
there has been speculation about nuisance cases and the possi-
bility that parties to them might bargain after judgment. Ronald
Coase used nuisance cases to illustrate his argument in The Prob-
lem of Social Cost,' and Calabresi and Melamed's famous article
on property rights and liability rules likewise used nuisance cases
to illustrate the nature of those remedies and when each of them
might be appropriate.2 Those articles in turn have spawned a vast
literature comparing the consequences of using property rights
and liability rules to protect entitlements. This literature builds
on the insight that parties to lawsuits can, at least in principle,
continue bargaining after judgment is rendered. If bargaining is
not too costly, the rights at stake in a case inevitably will end up
in the hands of the party willing to pay the most for them. The
literature explores how the law might facilitate such bargaining
t Associate Professor, Boston University School of Law. This Article has benefited
from conversations with innumerable colleagues at various law schools over the past two
years. Many thanks in particular to Jack Beermann, Brian Brooks, Ronald Cass, Janet
Farnsworth, Claire Hill, Dan Kahan, Vikramaditya Khanna, Adam Long, Steve Marks,
Richard Posner, and Cass Sunstein for helpful comments and advice.
1 Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J L & Econ 1, 19-28 (1960).
2 Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inal-
ienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv L Rev 1089, 1115-24 (1972).
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or, where transaction costs are prohibitive, mimic the results of a
bargaining process. While most of the articles in this genre make
arguments that apply to various areas of law, almost all use nui-
sance cases as illustrations of their approaches-and often as the
main illustration.3
There rarely is any suggestion, however, that the theories
and models advanced in the literature are based on observations
of bargaining. The models usually are based entirely on assump-
tions about how people act when they are awarded or denied enti-
tlements. While there have been occasional attempts to test the
Coase theorem in controlled experiments of various kinds,4 no
studies have examined what actual litigants do after judgment.
This Article investigates what actually happens after courts enter
judgment in nuisance cases. Do the parties keep bargaining? If
so, to what final result? If not, why not? Would their behavior af-
ter judgment have been different if the court had allocated the
rights differently?
Answers to these questions will not tell us how parties be-
have in the many cases that settle before reaching final judg-
ment. Nor will they necessarily tell us how parties behave after
judgment in other kinds of litigation. But the answers may have
some practical value just the same. When scholars discuss nui-
sance cases, they frequently offer observations and conclusions
that may have their most forceful bite elsewhere in the law. Nui-
sances are a "stock example"' intended to illuminate bigger is-
sues. So while this Article focuses on a particular type of legal
problem, it may have implications for the economic analysis of
other areas of law as well.
I will begin in Section I by describing in more detail the rea-
sons for the inquiry undertaken in this Article. Section II will de-
' For some recent examples, see Ian Ayres and Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining:
Dividing a Legal Entitlement To Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 Yale L J 1027, 1064, 1099-
1100 (1995); Keith N. Hylton, A Missing Markets Theory of Tort Law, 90 Nw U L Rev 977,
993-1006 (1996); Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules:
An Economic Analysis, 109 Harv L Rev 713, 754-55 (1996); James E. Krier and Stewart J.
Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 NYU L
Rev 440, 444-45, 466-75 (1995); Saul Levmore, Unifying Remedies: Property Rules, Liabil-
ity Rules, and Startling Rules, 106 Yale L J 2149, 2166-67 (1997).
' See, for example, Don L. Coursey, Elizabeth Hoffman, and Matthew L. Spitzer, Fear
and Loathing in the Coase Theorem: Experimental Tests Involving Physical Discomfort, 16
J Legal Stud 217 (1987); Elizabeth Hoffman and Matthew L. Spitzer, Experimental Tests
of the Coase Theorem with Large Bargaining Groups, 15 J Legal Stud 149 (1986). For an
interesting real-world empirical inquiry into the Coase theorem's operation in the em-
ployment context, see John J. Donohue III, Diverting the Coasean River: Incentive
Schemes to Reduce Unemployment Spells, 99 Yale L J 549 (1989). See also Robert Ellick-
son, Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (Harvard 1991).
Krier and Schwab, 70 NYU L Rev at 442 (cited in note 3).
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scribe the research methodology; Section III will recount the re-
sults. I will explore how the results might be interpreted in Sec-
tion IV and consider some limitations on the reach of the study in
Section V.
I. THE QuEsTIoN
Economic analysts have developed various models to describe
the consequences of using property rights and liability rules as
remedies. While there are many variations on these models, they
all tend to involve certain common premises. One is that if a
court fails to award the rights in a case to the party willing to pay
the most for them, that party will be interested in buying the
rights from the winner so long as bargaining is feasible (or, to be
precise, so long as the gains from trade exceed the costs of ar-
ranging a trade). Another common assumption is that nuisance
cases involving few parties often provide good examples of this
dynamic. This Section reviews the development of these two as-
sumptions in the literature of law and economics and explains
why they are promising subjects for empirical examination.
The core insight underlying the economic analysis of prop-
erty rights and liability rules as remedies runs as follows, in its
simplest and least controversial form: if (a) a court is considering
awarding a property right to one of the two parties to a dispute,
and (b) it is clear that if the court does this, the parties will want
to make a deal in which the winner would sell the rights to the
loser, but (c) the parties would have trouble effecting this wish
because of logistical problems ("transaction costs"), then (d) the
court has a good reason to replace the property right with an
award of damages that is equivalent to the deal that the parties
would make after judgment if they could. The difficulty with this
analysis is that courts often have to make decisions without being
sure about (b) or (c). Most of the literature on property rights and
liability rules amounts to advice to courts about how to act in the
face of that uncertainty: theories about when to expect that par-
ties will bargain after judgment or will want to do so, and about
how to devise remedies that will make the need for bargaining or
the logistical impediments to it less serious. I have described the
problem as involving a choice between remedies, but it also may
be thought to have significance in deciding who wins the case. In
the view of some economic theorists most concerned about effi-
ciency as a criterion for distributing rights, entitlements ought to
be assigned in the first place to the parties that would pay the
most for them-the better to obviate the need for a transaction in
which the loser buys the rights from the winner. But here again,
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a court may be uncertain which party would pay more for the
rights, and in that case the remedial question again comes to the
fore: the court's goal, perhaps, should be to devise remedies that
will make bargaining after judgment as cheap as possible.
Nuisance cases are a natural source of illustrations of these
theories, because they present simple and sometimes charming
fact patterns in which courts must pick between awarding prop-
erty rights to parties and awarding them money. A nuisance suit
arises when a plaintiff complains to a court that his neighbor is
interfering unreasonably with the use and enjoyment of his prop-
erty-usually because the neighbor is engaging in some activity
that is noisy, noisome, or otherwise offensive to the plaintiff. A
typical example of a nuisance case that has figured prominently
in law and economics scholarship is the old English case of Bry-
ant v Lefever.6 The plaintiff and the defendants were neighbors.
The defendants began rebuilding their house. The new structure
had higher walls than the old one, and the defendants also
stacked timber on their roof; the wall and the timber ran along-
side the plaintiffs chimney and caused some of the smoke from it
to back up into the plaintiff's house. The plaintiff sued, claiming
the wall was a nuisance. The court rejected the claim. Coase used
this case to illustrate his analysis in The Problem of Social Cost:
The smoke nuisance was caused both by the man who built
the wall and by the man who lit the fires .... On the mar-
ginal principle it is clear that both were responsible and both
should be forced to include the loss of amenity due to the
smoke as a cost in deciding whether to continue the activity
which gives rise to the smoke. And given the possibility of
market transactions, this is what would in fact happen. Al-
though the wall-builder was not liable legally for the nui-
sance, as the man with the smoking chimneys would pre-
sumably be willing to pay a sum equal to the monetary
worth to him of eliminating the smoke, this sum would
therefore become for the wall-builder, a cost of continuing to
have the high wall with the timber stacked on the roof.'
Richard Posner later clarified Coase's prediction about bar-
gaining:
According to Coase, it does not matter whether the court [in
Bryant v Lefever] analyzed the case correctly or not. Since
6 4 CPD 172 (1878-79).
Coase, 3 J L & Econ at 13 (cited in note 1).
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transaction costs were presumably low (why?),[8] the parties
would undo, by a voluntary negotiation, whatever allocative
error the court committed. If the cost of the smoke to the
plaintiff was greater than the cost to the defendants of
avoiding interference with plaintiffs chimneys by, say, re-
moving the timber from their roof, plaintiff would be willing
to pay defendants a sum great enough to induce them to re-
move the timber, and the efficient result would be obtained.
This is a straightforward application of the Coase theorem
Writers subsequent to Coase have followed suit in using nui-
sance cases as paradigmatic examples of the role that bargaining
after judgment might play in the law. Calabresi and Melamed, for
example, observe that "[nluisance or pollution is one of the most
interesting areas where the question of who will be given an enti-
tlement, and how it will be protected, is in frequent issue";'0 the
authors illustrate the argument in their paper by describing a
nuisance dispute between two neighbors, Taney and Marshall.
Taney creates pollution offensive to Marshall. The authors' gen-
eral suggestion is that a property right-an injunction against
Taney's pollution, or a finding of no liability for Taney-is a sen-
sible remedy from an efficiency standpoint if the court thinks that
the loser is the one who most cheaply can eliminate the problem.
But of course a court might be wrong in making such an assess-
ment, and the possibility of such mistakes makes it important to
consider the likelihood that the parties can bargain after judg-
ment:
If we were wrong in our judgments and if transactions be-
tween Marshall and Taney were costless or even very cheap,
the [property right for one side or the other] would be traded
and an economically efficient result would occur in either
case. If we entitled Taney to pollute and Marshall valued
clean air more than Taney valued the pollution, Marshall
would pay Taney to stop polluting even though no nuisance
was found. If we entitled Marshall to enjoin the pollution
and the right to pollute was worth more to Taney than free-
dom from pollution was to Marshall, Taney would pay Mar-
shall not to seek an injunction or would buy Marshall's land
and sell it to someone who would agree not to seek an injunc-
" Only two parties." Richard A. Posner, Teacher's Manual for Tort Law: Cases and
Economic Analysis (Little, Brown 1982) (answering n 2 on p 738 of the casebook).
Richard A. Posner, Tort Law: Cases and Economic Analysis 738 (Little, Brown
1982).
" Calabresi and Melamed, 85 Harv L Rev at 1115 (cited in note 2).
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tion.... Wherever transactions between Taney and Marshall
are easy, and wherever economic efficiency is our goal, we
could employ entitlements protected by property rules even
though we would not be sure that the entitlement chosen
was the right one. Transactions as described above would
cure the error."
The authors go on to discuss the benefits of using damages,
payable by either side to the other, in cases where transaction
costs are high enough to make bargaining infeasible-for exam-
ple, a case where "we enjoin Taney and there are 10,000 injured
Marshalls," and hold-out problems would make it impractical for
all the Marshalls to enter into a deal to let Taney off the hook,
much as they might like to do so. The lesson most commonly ex-
tracted from Calabresi and Melamed's analysis is that if transac-
tion costs are low, property rights best protect whatever entitle-
ments a court awards; if transaction costs are high, damages are
better-damages calculated to replicate the exchange the parties
would make if they could. 2
Writers following Calabresi and Melamed often have focused
on impediments to bargaining--"transaction costs"-and how
remedies might be fashioned to minimize or compensate for them.
The impediments discussed generally are various kinds of strate-
gic behavior: ways the self-interested conduct of rational profit-
maximizers might confound cooperation. The most commonly dis-
cussed varieties are, first, the problems involved in coordinating a
negotiation that involves large numbers of people, some of whom
may try to hold out for a disproportionate share of the gains from
trade or freeload on the deal made by others without paying their
share; and, second, the difficulties that can occur when just two
parties must deal with each other (a bilateral monopoly), as the
situation may tempt each side to waste time and money trying to
extract a large share of the gains from trade (a problem exacer-
bated by each side's possession of private information about how
much it really values the rights). 3 Other writers have suggested
"Id at 1118.
See Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 106-07 (Scott, Foresman
1988); William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law 30-
31 (Harvard 1987); Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 16, 77, 272 (Aspen 5th
ed 1998). See also Krier and Schwab, 70 NYU L Rev at 451, 452-53, 453 n 44 (cited in note
3) (identifying these two propositions as "conventional wisdom" and citing authors treat-
ing them as the upshot of Calabresi and Melamed's analysis).
"For discussions of these and other transaction costs and their suggested applications
to nuisance cases, see Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics at 170-80 (cited in note 12); A.
Mitchell Polinsky, Introduction to Law and Economics 18-20 (Little, Brown 2d ed 1989);
Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 68-71, 79-81 (cited in note 12).
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more complex possibilities as well. For instance, some have sug-
gested that if transaction costs are low enough for the parties to
bargain, they can bargain around an inefficient award of dam-
ages as well as around an inefficient injunction. 4 Others argue
that perhaps damages should be preferred generally because,
among other reasons, they facilitate bargaining by forcing parties
to reveal private information. 5 Then again, courts trying to com-
pute awards of damages might have trouble figuring out how
much each side values the rights at stake in the case, and errors
in making those assessments may be more costly than errors in
assigning a property right to the wrong side; some writers have
suggested that property rights therefore are better remedies than
damages in general, even where transaction costs are high. 6 And
of course all this is the greatly oversimplified story. Each of these
proposals has been spun out in much detail, and has been backed
up with substantial economic arguments. The proposals are
meant to have broad implications for the enterprise of creating
remedies. But for illustrative purposes, they invariably are ap-
plied by their authors to nuisance disputes.
As noted earlier, for the most part this literature has been
based on speculation about how parties might be expected to be-
have after judgment. The literature never discusses actual cases
and what happened when they were over. But there have been
occasional attempts at empiricism of other kinds. Professors
Hoffman and Spitzer, for example, have run controlled studies of
what university students do in situations intended to create a fa-
vorable climate for bargaining after entitlements are assigned to
them. 7 The general approach in these types of studies is to in-
struct the subjects to choose between receiving a small sum of
money distributed to them in equal shares or receiving a larger
sum unevenly distributed among them; the question is whether
they will agree to pick the bigger amount and then redistribute it
among themselves. The authors find that the subjects in these
experiments tend to cooperate, and on the basis of their studies
they conclude that
1 See Kaplow and Shavell, 109 Harv L Rev at 732-34 (cited in note 3); A. Mitchell
Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage
Remedies, 32 Stan L Rev 1075, 1088-92 (1980).
' See generally Ayres and Talley, 104 Yale L J at 1032 (cited in note 3); Louis Kaplow
and Steven Shavell, Do Liability Rules Facilitate Bargaining? A Reply to Ayres and Talley,
105 Yale L J 221 (1995); Ian Ayres and Eric Talley, Distinguishing Between Consensual
and Nonconsensual Advantages of Liability Rules, 105 Yale L J 235 (1995).
"6 Krier and Schwab, 70 NYU L Rev at 464 (cited in note 3). See also Saul Levmore,
Explaining Restitution, 71 Va L Rev 65, 79-81 (1985).
17 Hoffman and Spitzer, 15 J Legal Stud at 151 (cited in note 4).
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these results produce a presumption in favor of the Coase
Theorem for disputes involving substantial numbers of par-
ties. By "a presumption in favor of the Coase Theorem" we
mean that a judge or legislator who is considering choosing a
rule to govern a dispute in tort, contract, or property that in-
volves as many as thirty-eight parties should assume that
the parties can and will exhaust the gains from trade by vol-
untary agreement. One who would show that bargaining
breakdown is likely must bear the burden of proof.
Regardless of the ultimate success of the arguments for and
against Posner's version of the economic efficiency criterion
[ ], our experimental results should affect the tenor of the ar-
guments: One who is arguing for the use of the efficiency
norm may now claim that the norm describes what parties to
a bargain will decide to do for themselves. The judge, then, is
simply facilitating an inevitable process and is justifiably
concerned about promoting economic efficiency. By simply
choosing the efficient outcome, the judge merely saves soci-
ety the legal costs that would be incurred during a long bar-
gaining process."
The authors offer some applications of their conclusion. The
first application is to nuisance cases. They describe a hypothetical
case involving a dispute between the owner of a dog kennel and
some neighbors:
Our results suggest that the choice should be between [an
injunction for the plaintiffs, or a property right for the ken-
nel owner, rather than damages payable by either side,] be-
cause risk of breakdown in voluntary negotiations is ordi-
narily low, perhaps even if there are as many as thirty-eight
parties to the dispute. Where the kennel is not enjoined as a
nuisance, then the homeowners can by agreement pay the
kennel operator money to reduce the pollution. Where the
kennel operation is so enjoined, the optimal level of pollution
can be achieved, this time with payments from the kennel
operator to the homeowners. 9
, Id at 151, 170.
Id at 164. The authors note that "[tihe strength of these results may depend in part
on the nature of the participants to the dispute. If the homeowners are relatively homoge-
neous in their income and preference, the dispute may be more easily resolved than it
would be if they differed among themselves in these respects." Id at 163-64.
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I mean to have said just enough to indicate two things: the
paradigmatic role that nuisance cases have played in economic
discussions of when property rights and liability rules ought to be
used; and the mental picture of nuisance cases and the behavior
of the parties to them after judgment that generally has informed
those discussions. I will not try in this Article to say whether
property rights or liability rules are superior as remedies in any
particular circumstance. Rather, my purpose here is to examine
some actual nuisance cases and their aftermath and discover
whether they resemble the stories told in the economic literature.
We do not know whether parties to nuisance cases really do bar-
gain after judgment. If and when they do not, we do not know
why. We do not know whether the important obstacles to bar-
gaining are the problems of coordination and strategic behavior
that dominate the economic literature, or whether other aspects
of the norms, attitudes, or circumstances confronting the parties
may cause them to treat a court's judgment as final. A growing
literature explores ways in which human behavior may depart
from economists' conventional expectations, whether on account
of the "endowment effect," constraining norms, or other psycho-
logical or sociological considerations." This Article aims to con-
tribute to that project by presenting accounts of how actual liti-
gants have behaved in a setting that has been the subject of
much conjecture.
II. METHODOLOGY
In setting out to learn whether the behavior of parties to real
nuisance cases after judgment resembles the behavior envisaged
in the literature, I began by searching online databases of re-
ported judicial decisions for recent nuisance cases that involved
simple, classic fact patterns-the sort of cases Coase used to il-
lustrate his argument in The Problem of Social Cost, and that
have been the subject of so much subsequent consideration. In
particular, I sought cases that appeared to involve low transac-
tion costs by conventional standards: disputes between private
parties where practical impediments to bargaining-such as co-
ordination and holdout problems-seemed low, so that it was
plausible to suppose that the parties could bargain around the
court's judgment if they wanted to do so. I used cases that ended
with the award of a property right to one side or the other, be-
" These phenomena, and their relationship to this study, will be taken up in more de-
tail later. For an overview and references, see Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, and Rich-
ard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan L Rev 1471 (1998).
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cause those are the cases Coase and others most often have dis-
cussed; because those are also the cases most often said to pres-
ent a likely occasion for bargaining after judgment; and because
property rights are the most common remedies in nuisance cases.
To state the specific criteria for selecting the cases, then,
they had to involve ongoing private nuisances: lawsuits arising
from conduct of one neighbor that typically was bothersome to
the eyes, ears, or nose of another. They had to involve few parties:
suits involving just two neighbors, or perhaps a handful of fami-
lies living near each other-and in no case involving more than
forty people.2 They had to be cases in which a court entered a fi-
nal judgment consisting of a property right for one side or the
other (an injunction or a judgment of no liability for any reason).22
They had to be cases where there were no other claims between
the parties, or at least none that were entangled with the nui-
sance claims; for example, I avoided the many cases where the
plaintiff complained that the defendant was committing zoning
violations as well as creating a nuisance, since a successful claim
of a zoning violation by the defendant would foreclose the possi-
bility of bargaining after judgment between the parties. 3 And I
looked for cases several months old (to give the parties time to
bargain) but preferably not older than a year (so that the cases
would still be fresh in the minds of the lawyers who handled
them). I located twenty cases that fit all these criteria. All in-
21 This number is approximately the cutoff at which Hoffman and Spitzer have ex-
pressed confidence that bargaining feasibly can occur. Hoffman and Spitzer, 15 J Legal
Stud at 162, 171 (cited in note 4). The criterion was easy to satisfy: simple nuisance dis-
putes involving more than thirty people are rare, at least in the published opinions.
' This criterion, too, was easy to satisfy. Courts rarely limit successful nuisance plain-
tiffs to damages, and so far as I have been able to determine, the "Rule 4" remedy de-
scribed by Calabresi and Melamed, see 85 Harv L Rev at 1115-24 (cited in note 2), has not
been used in any reported nuisance case since it was introduced in Spur Industries, Inc v
Del E Webb Development Co, 108 Ariz 178, 494 P2d 700 (1972). Compare Joel C. Dobris,
Boomer Twenty Years Later: An Introduction, With Some Footnotes About "Theory", 54 Al-
bany L Rev 171, 180 (1990) (describing the compensated injunction as "a novelty item
from some academic rubber goods catalog"), with A. Douglas Melamed, Remarks: A Public
Law Perspective, 106 Yale L J 2209 (1997) (arguing that "Rule 4" remedies are widely used
in public law contexts).
I did not necessarily discard a case, however, if the zoning claims failed and the nui-
sance claims were sufficiently prominent, since bargaining would then remain a possibil-
ity. See, for example, Sedman v Rijdes, 127 NC App 700, 492 SE2d 620 (1997), and Kar-
piak v Russo, 450 Pa Super 471, 676 A2d 270 (1996). Both cases are described and dis-
cussed in the appendix.
' Actually I located a few more cases than that, but I will only discuss twenty of them
here. My initial inquiries were somewhat open-ended; I knew that I wanted to discover
what happened after judgment, but I wasn't sure what questions to ask the attorneys, and
my resulting notes were not sufficiently complete to warrant their inclusion as case stud-
ies. However, my preliminary investigations suggest that none of the omitted cases in-
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volved appeals, since those tend to be the cases that generate re-
ported decisions in the state courts. Most involved disputes be-
tween two homeowners or between a homeowner and a small
business, usually owned and run by one person or a family."
Later I will discuss some of the limitations of this methodology.26
After identifying these cases, I contacted the attorneys of re-
cord, seeking to interview them either by telephone or in writing
(or both) about what happened between the parties after judg-
ment. Usually I communicated with lawyers for both sides (and
told each of them that I was doing so). All of the lawyers I was
able to reach were willing to talk about their cases.27 I asked
whether the rights the court awarded had changed hands after
judgment, and if not, whether there were any negotiations over
that possibility. If there were no negotiations, I asked why not,
and whether the lawyers thought there would have been bar-
gaining after judgment if the court had decided the case the other
way (that is, if the loser had won). This last question was impor-
tant, because it addressed the possibility that if there was no
bargaining it was only because the court had assigned a property
right to the side that would have paid the most for it anyway. The
implication of such an assignment is that if it had been made the
other way-in other words, if the loser had won-then the loser
would have bought the rights from the winner, or at least would
have tried.
volved patterns that differ from the cases included in this Article. The excluded cases are
Aldridge v Morgan, 912 SW2d 151 (Tenn App 1995); Benjamin v Nelstad Materials Corp,
214 AD2d 632, 625 NYS2d 281 (1995); Kearney v Barrett, 1995 Tenn App LEXIS 4; Goeke
v National Farms, Inc, 245 Neb 262, 512 NW2d 626 (1994); LeFurgy v Long Cove Club
Owners Association, Inc, 313 SC 555, 443 SE2d 577 (SC App 1994).
' Ten of the cases involved disputes between homeowners; ten involved a business on
at least one side of the case. Just one involved small businesses on both sides: 44 Plaza,
Inc v Gray-Pac Land Co, 845 SW2d 576 (Mo App 1992). The division of the parties into
homeowners and businesses is rough. First, it sometimes is difficult to classify cases if
they involve homeowners engaged in low-level business activities. Examples include Tich-
enor v Vore, 953 SW2d 171 (Mo App 1991), in which the defendant kept several dogs on
his property with the eventual intention of showing and selling them, and Miller v Horn,
1996 Ohio App LEXIS 2678, in which the defendant was an old woman operating a motel
for cats. Second and more generally, the businesses involved in these cases, whether or not
they were incorporated, were relatively small, usually owned and run by one person or by
a family. As a result, the differences between these types of parties were not large. Nor, as
we shall see, did there tend to be important differences in their behavior. Perhaps because
old-fashioned nuisance disputes often arise in unincorporated areas where zoning rules do
not do much work, or perhaps for other reasons that I will discuss later, none of the simple
nuisance cases that fit the criteria just described were brought against large corporations.
See discussion in Section V.
In all, I communicated by telephone, mail, or both with lawyers for both sides in six-
teen of the cases. In the other four cases I relied on one side's account.
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III. RESULTS
To summarize the reports the lawyers offered in response to
these inquires, none of the parties in the twenty cases made
trades after judgment. They generally did not negotiate at all af-
ter judgment.28 Nor did the lawyers in these cases think there
would have been bargaining if the litigation had ended with a
judgment in the opposite direction.
Two impediments to bargaining after judgment figured
prominently in the lawyers' reports. First, in almost every case
the lawyers said that acrimony between the parties was an im-
portant obstacle to bargaining. The parties in these cases often
thought that their adversaries were behaving in ways that were
unreasonable, discourteous, and unneighborly. Frequently the
parties were not on speaking terms by the time the case was over
(sometimes much earlier).
The second recurring obstacle involves the parties' disincli-
nation to think of the rights at stake in these cases as readily
commensurable with cash. The lawyers often would say that their
clients "didn't want money. They wanted to get rid of the noise'
created by the defendants; or that the "money wasn't important"
to their clients in this context; or that the "[t]he case had to do
with your right to use your land as you damn well please"; or that
the lawyer's clients "weren't out to make a buck over the whole.
thing. They were concerned about their rights." Other lawyers
remarked on the difficulty their clients would have had in putting
a price on the rights at issue in the case. On reflection, the attor-
neys would concede that their clients might have been amenable
to a cash bargain if the price were extraordinarily attractive, but
they said that no such price would have been offered by either
side.
One of my goals in this Article is to offer a realistic picture of
the attitudes of parties to nuisance cases that are litigated to
judgment and of their behavior afterwards. Here I will describe
five illustrative cases. (The other fifteen are described in the ap-
Occasionally a proposal of some sort was suggested by one side and dismissed by the
other after judgment. See, for example, Slavant v Calhoun Motor Speedway, 626 S2d 771
(La App 1993), described and discussed in the text accompanying note 101. In no cases
were there reports of substantial negotiations.
' Possible exceptions are BAGKO Development Co v Damitz, 640 NE2d 67 (Ind App
1994) (see text accompanying note 37), which involved parties described by their lawyers
as "hard-headed," but who apparently got along all right, and Langan v Bellinger, 611
NYS2d 59, 203 AD2d 857 (1994) (see text accompanying note 109), which involved com-
plaints about a church's bells, and in which it was not clear whether acrimony was an im-
portant factor.
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pendix.) These cases are representative just in the sense that
they present nicely the kinds of problems the lawyers regularly
described. They also represent a mix of disputes between indi-
viduals on the one hand and between individuals and small busi-
nesses on the other.
Thomsen v Greve.3" The Thomsens (Elmer and Phyllis) and
the Greves (Ron and Nancy) are neighbors in Pender, Nebraska.
The Greves moved there in 1973; the Thomsens moved in next
door in 1990. In 1986, the Greves started using a wood-burning
stove as their primary means of heating their house. In 1992, the
Thomsens began complaining to the Greves that smoke from the
stove was finding its way into their house, bringing "rotten," "un-
bearable" smells with it and making the Thomsens physically
ill.11 The Greves suggested that the Thomsens keep their windows
and doors shut. Eventually the Thomsens filed a lawsuit seeking
to enjoin the Greves' use of their stove as a nuisance. The trial
court denied the Thomsens damages, but ordered the Greves to
increase the height of their chimney by thirty-six inches; the
court of appeals reversed in part, awarding damages and order-
ing the Greves to abate the nuisance, regardless of whether this
could be accomplished by extending the chimney. On remand, the
trial court modified the injunction to allow the Greves to use their
stove when the wind was from the west, southwest, or northwest
at a rate of at least ten miles per hour, which would be sufficient
to blow the smoke away from the plaintiffs' house.
The lawyers reported that after judgment the defendants
stopped using their stove altogether rather than try to adapt
their use to the conditions the court had set. There was no discus-
sion after judgment of the possibility that the defendants might
pay the plaintiffs for the right to continue using their stove as be-
fore; negotiations "did not occur because the defendants are the
most unreasonable people in the community" (according to the
plaintiffs' lawyer) or because "hard feelings resulting from this
litigation prohibited any reasonable resolution" (according to the
defendants' lawyer).
The lawyers for both sides agreed that if the defendants had
won the case, there likewise would have been no bargain struck
in which the plaintiffs paid the defendants not to use their stove:
"if the court had found no nuisance, the defendants would have
30 4 Neb App 742, 550 NW2d 49 (1996). This account is based on the opinion in the
case, questionnaires filled out by both lawyers, and telephone interviews with the lawyers
for the plaintiffs and the defendant (Feb 11, 1998).
3 550 NW2d at 52-53.
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continued burning garbage and whatever else they burned." "The
feelings in the matter were such that nothing was going to end
this dispute short of ridiculous sums of money changing hands to
buy the other side's house," the defendants' lawyer said. The
plaintiffs' lawyer had a similar view of the situation. "They hate
each other. They'll flip each other off as they drive by." The plain-
tiffs' lawyer had heard that the Greves' defense was financed by
their homeowners' insurance company, which he thought must
have spent more than $30,000 on the case. I asked him whether
the plaintiffs would have accepted $30,000 in cash to settle the
case, and he said probably yes; but no such offer was made. At
one point, the defendants did offer to buy the plaintiffs' house
outright for the price the plaintiffs had paid to acquire it, but the
plaintiffs "weren't interested in moving" and the defendants
weren't interested in paying the plaintiffs a sum large enough to
dislodge them.
Tichenor v Vore."2 Carl Vore lives near Wheaton, Missouri, a
semi-rural area; his house is just beyond the official town line, in
an unincorporated region. He raises dogs for the eventual pur-
pose of showing them and selling them. Next to his house he built
a kennel in 1995. Constructed of cinder blocks and a wood shingle
roof, the kennel served to house his Australian Sheperd show
dogs. The kennel contained pens for the dogs and "runs" along its
sides where they could be exercised. He kept about sixteen dogs
there.
Five neighboring families brought a nuisance suit against
Vore, complaining about the barking of the dogs. Charles Tiche-
nor, the lead plaintiff, testified that Vore's dogs would "[ble
barking hard enough, constant enough, you can't go back to sleep
... you lay there and listen to them dogs."33 At trial Tichenor also
said that he had been a "royal grouch" for the past year; "[t]he
dogs has finally just got me-my nerves shook. There ain't no
place to get away from it." Tichenor's wife put into evidence a
fifty-page typewritten diary of the aggravation the barking
caused her and her husband. The Tichenors said they "were often
unable to perform yard work, plant flowers, work in the garage or
enjoy their back porch because of the constant 'roar' of dog bark-
ing."4 Other neighbors who lived nearby, though not quite as
"953 SW2d 171 (Mo App 1997). This account is based on the opinion of the case, a
questionnaire filled out by the defendant's lawyer, and a telephone interview with the
plaintiffs' lawyer (Mar 13, 1998).
Id at 175.
Id.
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close as the Tichenors, testified to substantial but lesser degrees
of annoyance.
The trial court entered an injunction against the operation of
the kennel, permitting Vore to keep just two dogs. The court of
appeals affirmed. Since then, the injunction has been enforced;
there have been no discussions between the parties of the possi-
bility that Vore might purchase from the defendants the right to
continue housing his dogs in the kennel. The plaintiffs' lawyer
predicted that if Vore had made such overtures, his clients would
have said "not only 'No' but 'Hell, no: get your dogs out of there."
Mr. Vore's lawyer agreed: the plaintiffs "would not have agreed to
do anything for the benefit of the defendant for any amount of
money." But what if Vore had won the case-would the plaintiffs
have paid him to get rid of the dogs? Both lawyers thought not.
"It was obvious that both sides were pretty strong-willed," the
plaintiffs' lawyer said; he thought that offers to pay Vore "would
have fallen on deaf ears." "Money wasn't important to [Vore]. The
case had to do with your right to use your land as you damn well
please," he said.
The plaintiffs' lawyer compared this case to others where a
landowner builds a fence ten feet over his neighbor's property
line. In these situations, he said, one might think the land would
be easy to value and that a deal might be struck, but in his expe-
rience this was not so: "generally the emotions are so strong,
they're almost like the emotions in a divorce, because it's land in-
volved that's dear to their hearts"--"particularly in rural Mis-
souri, where land is important."
This is not to say that there has been no movement at all on
Vore's side. Though he has not been negotiating with the plain-
tiffs, he has been considering other ways that he might be able to
avoid trouble under the injunction and still bring back his dogs.
His lawyer wrote that "Mr. Vore is deciding whether to have his
show dogs 'de-barked' (a surgical procedure of severing the vocal
chords, thereby reducing the bark of the dog to a whisper)."
Payne v Skaar."5 Idaho Falls is a town on the Snake River in
Idaho populated by about 50,000 people. In 1971 Keith Skaar
bought a cattle feedlot on the north side of the town. At the time
it contained between 500 and 1,000 cows. The number grew to
5,000 by 1990. Neighbors living in homes nearby became un-
- 127 Idaho 341, 900 P2d 1352 (1995). This account is based on the opinion in the case
and on telephone interviews with the lawyers for the plaintiffs (May 21, 1996) and defen-
dants (Sept 12, 1996).
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happy with the smell. About ten couples and a few others in the
neighborhood established an organization dedicated to eradicat-
ing the feedlot. They sued Skaar, his wife, and the corporation
they had formed. On the recommendation of an advisory jury, the
judge entered an injunction ordering Skaar to make various im-
provements in sanitation and to reduce the number of cows to the
level that he maintained prior to the complaints. After an en-
forcement proceeding (and an unsuccessful appeal by Skaar on
several essentially technical grounds), the feedlot went out of
business. Skaar blames the lawsuit.
The lawyers agreed on the following points: there were no
discussions between Skaar and the plaintiffs, or among the plain-
tiffs, about the possibility that Skaar might pay them for permis-
sion to continue operating his feedlot at full strength. There
would have been no interest in such a transaction if it had been
suggested. The lawyers said that the plaintiffs did not want to be
bought out. They were focused on getting rid of the smells the
feedlot created, and did not think of the situation in terms of
money. In their view, Skaar in effect was dumping manure onto
their property without permission; they considered him a bad
neighbor whose discourtesy was offensive. The plaintiffs' lawyers
described the suit as a "contest of wills." The residents pressed
hard for the enforcement of every line of the injunction, even
when it became clear that Skaar could not feasibly comply;
Skaar's lawyer thus concluded that the basis for the suit was
"vendetta" rather than principle, and for that reason he agreed
with the plaintiffs' lawyers that negotiations to temper the terms
or enforcement of the injunction would have been futile.
If Skaar had won, would the neighbors have paid him to
scale back his feedlot? The lawyers thought not; they described it
as a "neighborhood dispute" with too much bad blood to be over-
come. From the plaintiffs' perspective, Skaar would have been too
stubborn to accept a deal; "people were threatened with firearms
and shovels at times" and Skaar was a "truculent, obdurate
man." From the defendant's perspective, in addition to the prob-
lems created by the personalities involved, Skaar was uninter-
ested in taking money to scale back. He was trying to grow his
business, and he claimed it would cost him a million dollars to
relocate.
Ball v Jorgenson.36 Mrs. Ball owned property adjacent to land
owned by a family named Jorgenson in Josephine County, Ore-
' 147 Or App 55, 934 P2d 634 (1997). This account is based on the opinion in the case,
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gon. A stream ran through the Jorgensons' property on a seasonal
basis, and when flooding became heavy, their horses were in dan-
ger of contracting "hoof rot" from standing in water. The Jorgen-
sons therefore dug ditches to channel the water diagonally across
their property line and onto Mrs. Ball's land (some of the water
already flowed in that direction, but the ditches increased and in-
tensified the flow of water onto her property). Mrs. Ball used piles
of dirt to block the flow of the water, and she brought a lawsuit
seeking to enjoin its diversion onto her land (she wanted the flow
restored to its state before the ditches were added); the Jorgen-
sons counterclaimed for an injunction requiring Mrs. Ball to re-
move the dirt she had placed in the water's path. The trial court
found for the Jorgensons. The court of appeals affirmed on the
ground that Mrs. Ball's trial lawyer had not objected properly at
trial to the jury instructions that were the subject of the appeal.
Mrs. Ball did not go on to pay or otherwise induce the Jor-
gensons to stop channeling the water onto her property. The law-
yer who handled her appeal wrote that "my impression was that
trial counsel on both sides had little or no client control. The par-
ties were so polarized by trial that any compromise post-
judgment was impossible." He said that the parties "disliked each
other intensely," and he thought this might have been an aberra-
tion caused by some unique features of Josephine County in
southern Oregon, a region he described as heavily populated with
"survivalists and crazy right-wingers" who are "retreating from
something," are "very intolerant of their neighbors," and "take an
extreme view of property rights." "I really feel that the litigants
couldn't be expected to reach an agreement, not because it
wouldn't have been reasonable, but because their views were so
extreme." Mrs. Ball's lawyer said the parties' positions were made
more intractable by the defendants' failure to ask the plaintiff for
permission before diverting the water onto her land; he said that
in this region, incursions by one property owner onto the land of
another sometimes seemed to ignite "something akin to 'road
rage'--people just snap." He thought that had happened here,
and said that the negotiations that did occur before judgment
consisted of "histrionics on both sides."
The lawyers did not think there would have been bargaining
if Mrs. Ball had won. The defendants' lawyer said he thought his
clients would have been ready to make an offer to Mrs. Ball, but
he thought "she would not have accepted anything"; he charac-
a questionnaire filled out by the plaintiffs lawyer, and telephone interviews with the law-
yers for the plaintiff (Feb 18, 1998) and defendants (Feb 12, 1998).
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terized her as "exceptionally hard-headed," and said that settle-
ment discussions had not been fruitful: she "wrote long, scathing
letters saying she recognized no authority but the Lord." Mrs.
Ball's appellate lawyer likewise said that "she would have
planted her feet" if she had won and would not have authorized
him to negotiate. The appellate lawyer thought that there might
have been an opening for a compromise of some sort if the case
had been remanded for retrial, because then he would have taken
over the case from the previous trial counsel, and he had a good
relationship with the lawyer on the other side of the case. He
thought that perhaps he and the other lawyer could have per-
suaded the parties to accept some sort of agreement rather than
go through another trial. But he said that a victory for either
side, as occurred here, foreclosed the possibility of negotiations.
BAGKO Development Co v Damitz" A building company
called BAGKO, owned by a man named Bagley and run by Bagley
and his son, bought property in Kokomo, Indiana and developed a
subdivision there called Willowridge. The first buyers in Willow-
ridge were Charles and Nila Damitz. They had three young sons;
Charles Damitz was a little league baseball coach. In addition to
the lot for the house, the Damitzes bought a neighboring parcel of
land and spent about $45,000 building a regulation-size baseball
diamond there. The diamond included lights, a pitching machine,
and a batting cage, and Mr. Damitz used it to coach two teams
from 4:00 until 7:30 p.m. two or three times a week from April
through June. Some other children from the neighborhood played
whiffle ball and other games on the diamond during the off-
season. There were no reports of balls flying onto anyone else's
property.
Mr. Damitz said that he obtained permission to build the
baseball diamond from the junior Bagley, who had agreed to al-
low it because Damitz had agreed to buy an expensive lot and
build an expensive house there. But when the senior Bagley
learned of this arrangement he strongly disapproved. He believed
that the property in the development should be used for residen-
tial purposes only, and along with a resident who lived next door
to the diamond, he sued Damitz on nuisance and other theories.
(In fact nine residents of Willowbrook complained about the
lights from the diamond; for eight of them, however, it was
640 NE2d 67 (Ind App 1994). This account is based on the opinion in the case and on
telephone interviews with the lawyers for the plaintiff (May 22, 1996) and defendants
(May 22, 1996).
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enough that Damitz agreed to reduce his use of the lights.)
Damitz offered to take down the lights on the field altogether to
get rid of the complaints from the remaining resident and from
Bagley, but Bagley was adamant that the diamond must go. After
a two-day bench trial, the court gave judgment to the Damitzes,
finding among other things that the baseball diamond was not a
nuisance; the court of appeals held this not to be clearly errone-
ous.
There were no negotiations after judgment. The baseball
diamond remains in place. Mr. Damitz gets along with his neigh-
bors, and by all accounts he is reasonable in his dealings with the
Bagleys (aside from the matter of the diamond). Both lawyers
characterized the parties as "hard-headed," and did not think ne-
gotiations after judgment would have gone anywhere, no matter
who had won the rights in court. If Bagley won, the diamond
would go (and presumably the land would be sold to someone
else). The lawyer noted that Bagley did not ask for damages. He
wanted an injunction or nothing. If Mr. Damitz won, the ballfield
would stay (and has stayed). Mr. Damitz was unwilling to con-
sider selling out to Bagley, his lawyer said, because he felt that
he had been promised he could have the diamond, and it meant a
lot to him.
IV. INTERPRETATION AND IMPLICATIONS
The sample of cases considered here is too small, and the
methodology too informal, to support aggressive generalizations
about how courts should resolve nuisance disputes. But the con-
sistency of the results in these cases is striking, and seems suffi-
cient to support a more modest conclusion: stylized economic de-
scriptions of nuisance litigation and its aftermath have omitted
consequential dimensions of human attitudes and behavior. The
omissions are important because they have caused the models to
generate potentially misleading predictions about behavior after
judgment. So while it is not possible to say that parties never
bargain after judgment in nuisance lawsuits, it is possible to say
that there are serious and potentially fatal obstacles to bargain-
ing after judgment-obstacles that deserve consideration in the
literature of remedies, and that courts interested in efficiency ig-
nore at their peril.
This Section examines those obstacles. First I discuss ways
in which parties' acrimony and their disinclination to treat the
rights at stake as commodities may eat away any bargaining
range that otherwise might exist between them. Next I examine
the extent to which those obstacles to bargaining after judgment
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may be related to the absence of markets for the rights at stake
in nuisance cases. Then I will consider whether the obstacles dis-
cussed here properly should be considered to be transaction costs;
lastly, I will argue that the results of this study illustrate the
need for more particularity in economic models if they are to gen-
erate useful advice.
A. The Destruction of Bargaining Ranges by Acrimony and
Resistance to Commodification
Begin with an economic restatement of what the lawyers de-
scribed. They commonly said that no amount of money would
have been enough to dislodge the rights from the winners-no
matter who won. On further examination the attorneys routinely
would concede that of course some amount of money would have
been enough to pry the rights away from the winner; it just would
have to have been an astronomical amount that the loser would
not have considered paying. (Or the converse: the loser did not
want to buy the rights from the winner, but might have come
around if the winner practically were giving the rights away.) In
effect, for the winners in these cases to sell their rights to the los-
ers, the losers would have been required to pay the winners a
premium to cover the distaste both of doing business with their
adversaries and of doing business at all in rights over which they
did not want to bargain. A price exists at which the winners
might have sold their rights to the losers, but for the enmity be-
tween them. The amount required to be added to that price in or-
der to get the winner to hold its nose and make the deal might be
called an acrimony premium. Similarly, the winner might have
accepted a certain price but for its aversion to exchanging cash
for the rights at stake in the case; the extra amount the loser
would have to pay to make the winner forget about that aversion
is a premium of another sort-perhaps a commensurability pre-
mium.38
The size of the premiums the winners would have demanded
is then magnified by the losers' likely lack of interest in paying
them. On the contrary: the losers want to be paid the premium
amounts, too. They may bring as much ill will to the table as the
winners do, and they may find the idea of a cash exchange as dis-
See, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 Colum L Rev
903, 943-44 (1996) (suggesting that people may be unwilling to accept money as compen-
sation for allowing a disagreeable outcome that is not normally measured in monetary
terms; if they do accept money, they may demand large premiums to compensate for the
shame of entering the transaction).
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tasteful as the winners do. In either case, the losers would only be
interested in making an exchange if the price were reduced to an
extent so irresistible that they were shaken out of their reluc-
tance to deal. So the premiums just described have the unusual
property of both driving up the price the winner would be willing
to accept and driving down the price the loser would be willing to
offer-regardless of who wins and loses. In a case where these
premiums are substantial, it is easy to see how they may destroy
any bargaining range that otherwise might have existed between
the parties' positions. They are termites that have the potential
to devour any surplus that might otherwise be created by a
court's decision one way or the other.
Any general illustration of the problem will be artificial be-
cause the idea of an acrimony premium distinct from the rest of a
party's valuation is strained. But imagine nonetheless that A
would be willing to pay $600 for the rights at issue in a case, and
B would be willing to pay $1,000. These, however, are the
amounts they would be willing to bid at an auction, not necessar-
ily in a different setting. Now suppose A is awarded the rights by
a court, apparently creating a $400 bargaining range. But A and
B come to detest each other. A's general view, though thinly ar-
ticulated, is that he won't sell the rights to B at any price, and B's
sense-also largely inarticulate, but firmly held-is that he'll be
damned if he's going to crawl back to A to offer him even a dime
for the rights. A would set his hard feelings to one side if the offer
were large enough-if it were $5,000 (suggesting an acrimony
premium of $4,400). Likewise, B probably would consider paying
A for the rights if the offer were stupendously low-say, $50. So
there will be no bargain; the bargaining range is smaller than the
sum of the acrimony premiums due from each side. It might be
different if A and B each just needed an extra $150 to get over
their disinclination to do business with each other; then the $400
apparent bargaining range would be reduced but not eradicated,
with $150 being added to the amount A demands, and $150 being
subtracted from what B is willing to pay. And in cases with suffi-
ciently high stakes (higher than those typically found in an ordi-
nary nuisance case), the bargaining range between the parties'
positions may be large enough to allow gains from trade even af-
ter the subtraction of substantial acrimony premiums. The exam-
ple is no different, so far as the economics are concerned, if the
disinclination to bargain is large but is completely one-sided (for
example, one of the parties is a hothead, but the other is a corpo-
ration that may not much care who it bargains with), or if the
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force at work is not acrimony but a distaste for cash exchanges in
the context at hand.
These phenomena bear some resemblance to the often ob-
served and more general difference between what people may be
willing to pay for a good and what they may demand for it if it
belongs to them. 9 Indeed, the results in this study might be con-
sidered a species of the endowment effect, ° which is one account
of the distinction between willingness to pay and willingness to
accept. One way to interpret these cases and the lawyers' views of
them is to say that a strong endowment effect attaches to judg-
ments from a court. One has to be careful in offering the endow-
ment effect as an explanatory tool, however, since the concept can
be defined and used in a number of different ways. Strictly
speaking, the endowment effect does not refer to just any differ-
ence between what a party would offer for a good and what a
party would demand for it. It refers to the increased value a per-
son may assign to a good just because they own it-because, in
other words, it has become part of their "endowment"4 -- though
the phenomenon also has been shown to be correlated with cer-
tain other attributes that goods may have, such as uniqueness.42
In any event, I believe that the parties' valuations in these cases
exhibit a similar pattern, but for reasons that are more compli-
cated and that are rooted more deeply in the details of the con-
texts in which the parties' disputes arose than the fact that one of
them owns the rights and the other does not. Specific features of
the parties' relationships to each other, and of their relationships
to the rights at stake in their disputes, made bargaining unap-
pealing.
See generally Don L. Coursey, John L. Hovis, and William D. Schulze, The Disparity
Between Willingness to Accept and Willingness to Pay Measures of Value, 102 Q J Econ 679
(1987); W. Michael Hanemann, Willingness To Pay and Willingness To Accept: How Much
Can They Differ?, 81 Am Econ Rev 635 (1991); Elizabeth Hoffinan and Matthew L.
Spitzer, Willingness to Pay vs. Willingness to Accept: Legal and Economic Implications, 71
Wash U L Q 59 (1993); Daniel Katmeman, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler, Ex-
perimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J Pol Econ 1325
(1990). For discussions that use this phenomenon to critique economic analysis, see Mark
Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52
S Cal L Rev 669, 685-95 (1979); Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement
Problems: A Critique, 33 Stan L Rev 387, 401-21 (1981).
, See Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J Econ Behav
& Org 39, 43-47 (1980). See also Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 98 J Pal Econ at 1325
(cited in note 39) (discussing endowment effects in bargaining over legal rights); Richard
H. Thaler, Quasi Rational Economics 184 (Russell Sage 1991) (specifically noting that
"[t]he existence of the endowment effect reduces the gains from trade").
"See Thaler, Quasi Rational Economics at 169 (cited in note 40).
See id at 167-88.
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B. The Function of Markets
I want now to explore the possibility that the practical and
cognitive obstacles to bargaining just discussed might be under-
stood as resulting from the absence of vigorous markets for the
rights typically at stake in nuisance cases. By an absence of vig-
orous (or "thick") markets, I am referring to the fact that the par-
ties in these cases were able to deal only with each other and that
there often were no good substitutes for the goods involved in
their disputes. In a robust market (as I will use the term), there
is competition for goods and they have ready substitutes." In
suggesting that the lack of bargaining in these cases may be re-
lated to the absence of markets for the rights involved, I am not
referring only or even primarily to the problems usually thought
to be presented by thin markets, such as the possibility that an
absence of competition might permit both sides to hold out for
payments much greater than their true reservation prices. The
obstacles to bargaining presented in these cases-or at least
those problems in the forefront of them-do not appear to involve
strategic behavior or the fear of it. Rather, I argue that markets
may reduce the incidence and significance of the acrimonious at-
titudes of the parties in these cases, and that markets bring with
them (and are made possible by) a set of values and a way of
thinking about entitlements that the parties in these cases did
not share. The cognitive and normative function of markets, as
well as their practical function, is to encourage the kinds of
transactions that did not occur after judgment in these cases.
1. Acrimony.
The first obstacle to bargaining the lawyers identified was
acrimony, grudges, or bad chemistry between the parties; lawyers
who had handled a number of nuisance cases sometimes re-
marked on their "rancorous" nature and on the rancorous nature
of property litigation between neighbors generally. If two people
are not on speaking terms, it may seem easy enough to under-
stand why they do not bargain. On reflection, however, it might
, See Ian Ayres and F. Clayton Miller, 7ll Sell It to You at Cost": Legal Methods to
Promote Retail Markup Disclosure, 84 Nw U L Rev 1047, 1058 n 43 (1990) (defining a
"thick market" as "one in which parties publicly trade so many homogeneous products that
a well-developed spot price is readily available"); David D. Haddock, Jonathan R. Macey,
and Fred S. McChesney, Property Rights in Assets and Resistance to Tender Offers, 73 Va
L Rev 701, 706 (1987) (Ihick markets are characterized by frequent transactions of
nearly homogeneous units."); Jeffrey Standen, The Fallacy of Full Compensation, 73 Wash
U L Q 145, 223 n 298 (1995) (contrasting a 'thick market,' where substitution is readily
available, and [a] 'thin market,' where it is not").
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seem a little odd that ill will should play an such important role
in the parties' unwillingness to bargain, since the parties had
lawyers to handle their negotiations, and in some business con-
texts parties may bargain despite not liking each other at all.
Why is acrimony so important here?
Perhaps the answer has to do with the function of markets
and their absence in these cases. As a practical matter, markets
make transactions quicker. They reduce the need for personal in-
teraction between buyers and sellers and usually eliminate the
need for buyers and sellers to be in close proximity either before
or after their business is done. Vigorous markets thus tend to
make transactions less personal and more faceless; purchasers
are focused on what they are buying, not the identity of the seller.
Neighbors in nuisance disputes do not have those advantages.
Judgment arrives after a long series of previous moves between
the parties-antagonistic moves, if the parties are litigating. And
while the parties may have lawyers who can bargain on their be-
half, this only avoids one sort of face-to-face contact between
them. They enjoy no anonymity of any other sort, and they usu-
ally will have to assume that they are stuck with each other for
the foreseeable future. The identities of the buyers and sellers are
uppermost in each others' minds.
The nature of the right makes it still more difficult to sepa-
rate from the person selling it. A bargain after judgment in a nui-
sance case often would resemble a kind of personal service con-
tract-a contract in which one party agrees to perform or not per-
form some activity, rather than a contract that provides for the
simple exchange of a thing. It is harder to depersonalize this kind
of service contract than a contract for goods, because the subject
of the contract is the seller's own behavior. The rights involved in
these nuisance cases were also personalized on their other end-
the receiving end, as it were. Where the issue is the allocation of
a simple good, one party can end up with it and the other can
move on. Here, the right at stake consists in part of one
neighbor's right to inflict disutility on another. It is not just A's
right to a given stick in the bundle that is at issue; it is A's right
to poke B with it.
Sometimes a lack of anonymity between parties to a bargain
can be an advantage, of course, as in situations where one neigh-
bor makes an "off-market" transaction to sell some property to
another when they are on friendly terms, or where a budding
nuisance dispute is nipped with a phone call to the neighbors
asking them to turn the music down. The bargain in turn may
even improve their relationship; it may amount to an exchange of
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favors that adds to the good will between neighbors. Bargains
outside of markets thus may have communicative components
and other meanings that robust markets might otherwise have
diluted. But of course not everyone is equally accommodating,
and inevitably some neighbors will be radically unaccommodat-
ing. (And one neighbor who is perceived as falling into that cate-
gory may incite others to follow suit.) In these instances the per-
sonalization of the bargain, and the side meanings it connotes,
can become a great disadvantage. A bargain requires a compro-
mise, which often will entail a show of respect for the importance
of another's interests. That respect may be wanting. Either party
may be eager to avoid making the other better off.
Finally, strong markets may soften the impact of prickly
people even in situations where the parties to an exchange do
care a lot about the identities of their trading partners. Those
who feel strongly about their partners can choose among many;
the significance of their idiosyncrasies likely will be washed out
by the offsetting idiosyncrasies of others. If the parties' views of
each other are not idiosyncratic-in other words, if a player earns
a general reputation as a bad egg-the bad egg will be punished
by the market and perhaps driven out of it altogether. And in a
pinch there may be possibilities for arbitrage:" an intermediary
can do business with each of the parties without their needing to
do business with each other.45 But in a neighborhood nuisance
dispute, the significance of prickles and other idiosyncrasies is
magnified. There is no market that can punish and thus curb the
expression of temperamental inflexibility; likewise there is no
market into which one can escape by resorting to other buyers or
sellers.
2. Distaste for bargaining.
The other thread that runs persistently through the lawyers'
accounts is that their clients would have found the prospect of a
cash exchange altogether distasteful, apart from the identity of
the partner to the exchange. The precise nature of this distaste is
difficult to pinpoint, since it often was expressed imprecisely in
remarks to the effect that the parties weren't "in it for the
"Or at least those possibilities may exist in the perfect markets that are the subjects
of economic models; for a skeptical view of the likelihood that arbitrage can do much to
overcome the choices of "quasi-rational agents" in most actual markets, see Thaler, Quasi
Rational Economics at 191 (cited in note 40).
, See Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler, 50 Stan L Rev at 1486 (cited in note 20) (citing the
possibility of arbitrage as one reason for the close relationship between spot market and
futures prices). But see Thaler, Quasi Rational Economics at 191 (cited in note 40).
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money," or weren't "thinking of their rights in that way." While
any attempt to explain these attitudes must therefore be some-
what speculative, I will suggest that they may be related in inter-
esting ways to the absence of markets for the rights at stake in
these cases. More specifically, the parties' attitudes may result
from the lack of close substitutes for the rights involved in these
cases; or it may be that putting the rights up for sale would have
seemed to degrade the rights, or degrade the parties, in ways that
would have made the parties uncomfortable. These two possibili-
ties may in turn be related, and both may be connected-both as
causes and as effects-to the absence of markets here.
a) Sources of distaste for bargaining: Problems of substitution
and commensurability. There are not ready substitutes for the
rights involved in nuisance cases. If I obtain an injunction re-
quiring you to get rid of your barking dogs (or perhaps have them
"de-barked"), and you offer me cash to dissolve the injunction, I
cannot use the cash to buy peace and quiet to replace the peace
and quiet I have sold away. Perhaps I could buy earplugs, or a
loud stereo, or louder dogs of my own; but all of these solutions
may well be quite inferior alternatives to being rid of the barking.
If I could sell you my whole house, that would be a little different:
then I could buy a different house, which, while not a perfect sub-
stitute, might at least be close. (Accordingly, mention of the pos-
sibility of buying a neighbor's whole house occasionally occurred
before judgment in the cases considered here.) That there are no
close substitutes for an entitlement does not make it either infi-
nitely valuable or entirely incommensurable with cash, of course.
Trade-offs between goods that are imperfectly commensurable
are often made by individuals on their own out of necessity, as
when Mr. Vore decided whether to keep, sell, or de-bark his dogs.
But making such deals with others, explicitly and for cash, may
make people uncomfortable for several reasons.
First, an absence of close substitutes makes it hard to put a
price on an entitlement, and its holder may feel most comfortable
erring on the side of caution and saying that it's "not for sale" (or
in any event would be for sale only at some very high price). He
thus minimizes the risk that he will feel regret once the unique
good is lost. The agony of putting a price on a unique good is
likely to be most severe when part of the reason for the good's
uniqueness is that its owner is emotionally involved with it. Per-
haps many people would be willing to forgo one of their hands for
an extraordinarily large sum of money, but I would venture that
few would want to figure out just how much they would demand
to enter into such an arrangement, and that most people would
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find it dreadful to make the calculation if pressed.46 Nor do ordi-
nary homeowners want to make a distressing determination of
how much they would demand to put up with obnoxious odors in
their home on a regular basis. So again, if a price were requested,
the prospective seller might react to his unease by declining to
name one, or by naming one so high that it seems unthinkable
that it could be met (and so high that if somehow it were met, the
seller would make the deal without any fear of remorse).47
Additionally, apart from the danger of regret, some parties
may regard their rights in ways that make them poor candidates
for a cash exchange. The act of putting rights up for sale requires
a decision to think of them as commodities, which parties may re-
sist. Compare two situations: one in which A offers B $5,000 for
B's family heirloom, and B declines, saying that it is not for sale
and that he has no interest in bargaining over it; the other in
which A accidentally destroys the heirloom, and the two parties
agree that $5,000 is reasonable compensation for it. In the latter
case the decision to "sell" the heirloom has been forced upon B; to
accept cash in return for the heirloom requires no distasteful de-
cision by B to treat it as suitable for sale. Likewise, a dog owner
might decline to order a $5,000 medical operation on the animal
that is certain to extend its life; yet if a doctor offers to buy the
dog from the same owner for $5,000 so that it can be gassed and
made the subject of medical experiments, the owner might not
entertain the offer at all.' The point is just that even if people
make trade-offs between poorly commensurable goods, that does
not mean their valuation of those goods is stable or easily reduced
to cash terms. It may not be possible to state any one price that
the owner of an entitlement places on it; its value may depend on
who is asking and why and on what sort of statement the parties
would be making about the right-and about themselves-by en-
tering into a cash transaction for it.49 These are instances of hu-
man complexity. Whether they are instances of irrationality in ei-
ther a lay or economic sense is another and more difficult ques-
tion."0
See Sunstein, 96 Colum L Rev at 943-44 & n 150 (cited in note 38) (noting that indi-
viduals often may be reluctant or unwilling to calculate the monetary sum they would ac-
cept to allow an unpleasant event to take place).
See Thaler, Quasi Rational Economics at 15-18 (cited in note 40).
This example is based on a similar one used in Sunstein, 96 Colum L Rev at 943-44
(cited in note 38).
See generally Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (Harvard 1995).
5 In their discussion of economic rationality, Cooter and Mlen note that "behavior can
be rational even though the ends are anti-social." Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics at
11 (cited in note 12). But they also define rationality as requiring that the parties' prefer-
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The possible application of this principle to the nuisance
cases considered here is that for the parties, the very act of en-
tering into cash bargains with their enemies over their families'
rights to comfort, or their right to carry on their livelihoods,
might itself have entailed sacrifices. Thus the "price" that the
holder would state in such a situation is not a price for the rights
per se; rather, the "price" would reflect the cost of selling rights to
a particular neighbor against the background of a particular his-
tory or context of beliefs and norms that makes cash bargaining
for the right uncomfortable. The parties did not think of their
rights as bargaining chips, and they did not particularly want to
think about them that way. Their preferences and sense of value
could have been be flattened onto an accountant's spreadsheet,
Mercator fashion, but the process would have distorted them in a
way that obliterated any bargaining range.
b) Sources of distaste for bargaining: Meanings of bribery. I
want now to explore one particular source of the parties' distaste
for bargaining that some of the lawyers mentioned: the aversion
their clients would have felt toward the prospect of paying their
adversaries not to do things they didn't want them to do. One of
the lawyers referred to this as the prospect of a "bribe," which
seems a fair enough characterization. The "best briber" has made
frequent appearances in the literature of economic analysis,5 but
not everyone is comfortable with the idea of paying bribes, even
broadly defined. How often do we offer cash to other people to
stop engaging in conduct that we do not like?52 Not often, at least
not in this culture at this time.
To take a homely example, if I were sitting near a pair of
loudmouthed patrons in a theater (a small-scale but potentially
ences be "stable" in the sense that they "must be transitive at any point in time, and they
must not alter very quickly with the passage of time." Id at 234 & n 8. Compare Richard
A. Posner, Overcoming Law 16 (Harvard 1995) ("The individual imagined by economics is
not committed to any narrow, selfish goal such as pecuniary wealth maximization. Noth-
ing in economics prescribes an individual's goals. But whatever his goal or goals... he is
assumed to pursue them in forward-looking fashion by comparing the opportunities open
to him at the moment when he must choose"); Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Exchange,
and Auction: Philosophic Aspects of the Economic Approach to Law, 68 Cal L Rev 221, 225
(1980) ("Coase's theorem is not an empirical claim but is instead an analytic truth about
what it means, under certain conditions, to act rationally.").
" See, for example, Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic
Analysis 150-52 (Yale 1970); Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 662 (cited in note 12)
("The settlement out of court of a tort or contract or private antitrust case is a form of per-
fectly lawful bribery, although the term is not used in these settings (except by econo-
mists!), because of its pejorative connotation.").
5' By "conduct" I refer to primary conduct in the world-and thus would distinguish
this problem from the payment of a settlement that stops a plaintiff from the "conduct" of
bringing a lawsuit.
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acute nuisance), I might go to great lengths to quiet them. One
thing I would not do, however, is offer them cash, even at the in-
termission when conventional transaction costs might be low. The
reasons for my unwillingness to offer cash are difficult to pin-
point. No doubt an economist could identify possible sources of
transaction costs latent in the situation (for example, some way
in which strategic behavior or fear of it could create difficulties),
but the problem seems to have more dimensions than that. As the
lawyers in the nuisance cases sometimes noted, people do not like
to pay for things that they do not think they should have to pay
for. Perhaps the source of my unease is that paying the boors
would imply a concession on my part that they are entitled to do
what they are doing, and indeed that they are entitled to be paid
to stop doing it. But there is still more to the resistance: an offer
of cash would feel vaguely humiliating. It would be a hint of des-
peration, perhaps, or a minor form of groveling. Maybe the diffi-
culty is that money, like law, is a substitute for violence, so that
an offer of cash might seem a confession of impotence; or maybe it
is that money is an instrument that people of means use to avoid
the more unpleasant aspects of existence, so that an offer of cash
to make a problem go away makes an awkward statement about
class. Whatever the explanation, offering to pay for the quiet that
seems rightfully mine would feel worse than enduring its loss.
The transaction has a communicative component, and it is intol-
erable-or at least would be sufficiently distasteful to prevent
any bargaining given the stakes involved. 3 If I were competing
In his discussion of Sturges v Bridgman, 11 Ch D 852 (1879), a famous English nui-
sance case, Brian Simpson expressed his doubts about the likelihood of a bargain after
judgment in related terms:
The reason why a market transaction in the sense of a purchase and sale of rights is
usually not possible in such situations is that the parties are not willing to place their
rights in the market. Once this is understood it becomes offensive not to respect this
unwillingness. Life would indeed be quite intolerable if individuals did not in general
respect social limits to the market-when invited to a dinner party it is unacceptable
for a guest to make offers for the silverware or the wine or the pictures which adorn
the dining room, or to attempt to sell life insurance to fellow guests.
A.W. Brian Simpson, Coase v. Pigou Reexamined, 25 J Legal Stud 53, 87 (1996). Else-
where Simpson offers a similar analysis of another English nuisance case, Tipping v St
Helen's Smelting Co, 122 ER 588 (1863). There are, he suggests,
powerful social limits to the market, and those who offer money to resolve quarrels
run a serious risk of aggravating the situation. The story of the negotiations between
Tipping and his neighbour illustrates both points. Quarrelling neighbours and com-
mon lawyers, engaged in the process of dispute resolution at the margins of a largely
traditional system of property law, inhabit one world, which is real and very untidy.
Economists inhabit another world. Between them a gulf seems to be fixed.
A.W. Brian Simpson, Leading Cases in the Common Law 194 (Oxford 1995).
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against the boors at an auction where the right to silence them
were being sold, I might well outbid them, but that is another
case (like the case of the accidentally destroyed heirloom) where
others already would have done the work of conceptualizing the
situation as one that will be resolved by paying cash.
A similar phenomenon may be part of the explanation for the
parties' behavior after judgment in these nuisance cases. The
parties may have been up against a set of manners and norms,
both external and internal, that regulate the propriety of a cash
exchange. They tended to have strongly held views about the
righteousness of their positions, particularly about their right to
enjoy their property as they saw fit. Offering thousands of dollars
to their enemies to do what their enemies were supposed to do for
free would have been hard on the parties' sense of themselves. It
also might have been hard on the parties-and perhaps on their
local reputations-to reveal themselves as being "in it for the
money." Like most things, perhaps, those sensibilities have their
price, but it was too high (relative to the stakes of the cases) to
contemplate. As noted in the discussion of acrimony, the commu-
nicative component of a cash payment-here, the dash of hu-
miliation that may accompany it, whatever the origins of such a
reaction may be in this culture at this time-can go a long way
toward preventing a bargain.54
These observations may help us understand the types of ne-
gotiations that occurred before judgment in the cases considered
here. They tended to be of two kinds. First, there were adjust-
ments made for "free" (in other words, without any exchange of
money) to make the dispute go away (another form of compensa-
tion); an example is the reduced use of the lights on the baseball
diamond in the Damitz case. And there were all-or-nothing offers
to buy or sell the property at issue; the offers in Parker v Ash-
ford55 (one of the racetrack cases) are an example. There is an es-
tablished market for entire pieces of property, so offering to buy a
neighbor's house to resolve a dispute implies nothing novel or of-
fensive, and occasionally is done. I did not find any cases where
either side offered to pay or take money in return for a change in
conduct or for an incremental adjustment of their rights. I believe
See Kelman, 52 S Cal L Rev at 694-95 (cited in note 39); Cass R. Sunstein, Incom-
mensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 Mich L Rev 779 (1994). For some economic
speculation about the reasons for the discomfort, see Eric A. Posner, The Strategic Basis of
Principled Behavior: A Critique of the Incommensurability Thesis, 146 U Pa L Rev 1185
(1998).
5 661 S2d 213 (Ala 1995). For a discussion of the case, see text accompanying note
104.
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that those kinds of offers would have given some offense to pre-
vailing norms about appropriate uses of cash.
c) The absence of markets as cause and effect of the distaste
for bargaining. I have suggested a few possible reasons why bar-
gaining for cash might have seemed inappropriate to the parties
in these cases. If these ways of thinking about the parties' atti-
tudes have merit, might they be understood as resulting from the
absence of markets for the rights at issue? The answer was more
straightforward when the obstacle under consideration was acri-
mony between the parties, because as a practical matter a robust
market may allow parties to avoid each other. Here the answer is
more complex, because markets have a number of features that
might bear on the parties' attitudes toward bargaining. And the
parties' attitudes toward bargaining may help explain the ab-
sence of markets, rather than the other way around.
I suggested that the parties' reluctance to bargain resulted in
part from the lack of good substitutes for the rights involved in
these cases. In a thick market that would not be a problem-
though it is a bit difficult to visualize a thick market for the
rights at stake here. First, we would have to imagine a situation
in which parties on either side of a nuisance case are in
competition with others to sell their rights.56 And then we would
have to imagine good substitutes for the rights: a world where, as
suggested earlier, the plaintiffs peace and quiet or the
defendant's barking dogs are readily replaceable, or in which
units of sentimental value and emotional attachment are
experienced by the parties as fungible. Under those
circumstances we would have truly thick markets for the rights
in these cases, which might indeed have made bargaining after
judgment more likely. But to imagine such a state of affairs is not
just to imagine some logistical changes that would make
bargaining more efficacious. It is to imagine the goods at stake
altered in fundamental ways.
Or perhaps it is to imagine the parties themselves altered in
fundamental ways. To say there are no substitutes for a good is to
make a statement about the way people feel about the good, not
One might imagine a situation where each member of a large group of plaintiffs has
the right to completely release the nuisance-creating defendant from an injunction that a
court has issued, so that the members of the plaintiffs' group would bid each other down to
their reservation prices. Or to reverse the situation, one might imagine a large group of
defendants; all of them are necessary partners in creating a nuisance (but the courts have
given the defendants the right to continue their activities). If the plaintiff can buy out just
one of the defendants, the nuisance will end. So each of the partners in the creation of the
nuisance lowers its price; each competes with the others until their reservation prices are
smoked out, as it were.
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about the good itself. People decide whether they think that goods
have substitutes. If Vore had thought that one place for raising
his dogs was as good as the next, or if he had felt ready to substi-
tute freely between dogs and cats, there would have been no sub-
stitution problem in Tichenor v Vore; if Damitz had felt that other
uses of his land were just as satisfactory as using it as a baseball
diamond, there would have been no substitution problem in
BAGKO v Damitz. No doubt there are many cases where parties
do feel roughly that way about their rights. For those parties,
compromises are easy enough to make; the goods involved-
which may, from an objective standpoint, look similar to the
goods at stake in the cases recounted here-do have substitutes,
so far as their owners are concerned. The cases considered in this
Article, however, are precisely those in which the parties doubted
that, so far as they were concerned, there were satisfactory
substitutes for the entitlements at issue. The absence of markets,
in the sense of plentiful chances to make substitutions, thus may
not be the most powerful way of explaining the lack of bargaining
after judgment in the cases considered here. Since substitut-
ability is a subjective conclusion, rather than an inherent
property of entitlements, that explanation would just amount to
saying that the parties would have bargained after judgment if
they had felt differently about their rights. One could as well
reverse the propositions and say that if the parties had felt
differently about their rights, there would have been plenty of
substitutes for them-and, in effect, thick markets.
It would risk a similar tautology to say that robust markets
would have removed the other reasons I have suggested for the
parties' reluctance to bargain: their discomfort toward the pros-
pect of treating their entitlements as commodities, or toward the
prospect of bribing their adversaries. No doubt those impedi-
ments to bargaining would have dissolved if the parties were op-
erating in a well-functioning market, rather than being forced to
deal only with each other. Markets consist in part of signals indi-
cating when and where and what it is appropriate to exchange;
they grease the cognitive skids that enable people to make substi-
tutions between what they own and dollars, and between dollars
and what they want. Markets also consist in part of norms that
make the purchase and sale of entitlements seem ordinary. They
strip bargaining of its communicative aspect, and in particular of
the malodorous social meaning that may attach to suggestions
outside of a market that someone pay their neighbor to behave
better. So if the parties had been operating in robust markets,
they might well have felt differently about bargaining. But the
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point here resembles the one made a moment ago: where an offer
of cash would entail a loss of face, to say that this would not be a
problem if there were a robust market amounts to little more
than saying there would have been no obstacle to bargaining if
the parties had felt differently about their rights or about bar-
gaining. Likewise, to say that norms disfavoring certain types of
cash offers would have presented no difficulties if markets had
been well-functioning may be little more than a truism, akin to
saying just that norms would not have been obstacles if they had
been different."
To sum up, thin markets are a familiar way to explain fail-
ures of bargaining when the reason for the failures is strategic
behavior by the parties. Competitive markets tend to make stra-
tegic behavior untenable; it is hard for a party to bluff if others
are competing to make more attractive bids. But when, as in
these cases, the impediment to bargaining is that the parties do
not want to bargain-because they detest each other, because
they are laboring under various norms about appropriate ex-
changes of cash, or because they have attitudes toward their
rights that make them awkward subjects for cash exchanges-
then blaming the lack of bargaining on the absence of thick
markets is more problematic; it may be just as accurate to blame
the absence of markets on the parties' attitudes toward their
rights and their norms about bargaining.
The existence of these attitudes and norms creates a vulner-
ability for economic models that predict bargaining in settings
where markets are not established-models that effectively treat
low transaction costs as synonymous with robust markets, with-
out considering the possibility that robust markets consist not
just of circumstances that make cash exchanges easy but also of
norms and beliefs that make it comfortable to treat rights as
commodities. This discrepancy between the market-like norms
about bargaining that economists imagine and the other norms
that lawyers may encounter even when transaction costs are low
might be behind the odd suggestion, made by one of the plaintiffs
lawyers in Payne v Skaar, that "[i]f Easterbrook ran the feedlot
and Posner were the neighbor, we might have been able to nego-
tiate something,""8 but that the "frame of reference of these peo-
Maybe the "if only there were a thick market" counterfactual can be given a little
more substance by focusing on the competition that markets imply, and the ways in which
the existence of competition may change norms: the parties to these cases might have felt
differently if they were surrounded by lots of other bidders; the other bidders not only
would create competition but would make bargaining seem "normal" and not dishonorable.
' The maker of this improbable prediction was a graduate of the Northwestern Uni-
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ple" was different. At first this sounds like a mistake on the order
of supposing that a Freudian is someone who acts as Freudian
theory would predict. But the attorney was gesturing toward a
more reasonable point: translating entitlements into opportuni-
ties for pecuniary improvement does not come naturally or com-
fortably to everyone. Daniel Farber has noted that "[i]f the idea
that victims bribe polluters is startling, people are not likely to
think of it themselves; if they do not think of it themselves, they
are not likely to do it. If only a brilliant person can think of doing
something, it is unlikely that most people will adopt that course
of conduct."59 You don't have to be brilliant to behave as an
economist would predict; but to see a court's judgment as the
starting point for a round of negotiations rather than as the final
chapter in a dispute, it may help to have had some practice
thinking that way or some cues from elsewhere in the environ-
ment that make such possibilities seem available and not dishon-
orable.6 ° Economists habitually see those possibilities. For those
less quick to see them or slower to warm to them, there are mar-
kets: sets of norms that make it seem natural and untroubling to
trade cash for rights. Outside of markets, for one ordinary indi-
vidual to pay another not to do something seems distasteful-or
so I hypothesize. This is an area ripe for further research. The
economics of nomnarket behavior have been studied,6 but the na-
ture and extent of people's willingness to exchange cash for vari-
ous kinds of rights and behaviors outside of markets have not re-
ceived comparable attention.
C. Transaction Costs
One possible reaction to the behavior described here is that it
only shows how high transaction costs are even in simple nui-
sance cases. But are the obstacles to bargaining in these cases-
the parties' bad blood and their distaste for bargaining-properly
thought of as transaction costs?62 What stance should the law
versity School of Law.
Daniel A. Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 70 Minn L Rev 917, 919-20 (1986).
Compare Robert H. Frank, Thomas Gilovich, and Dennis T. Regan, Does Studying
Economics Inhibit Cooperation?, 7 J Econ Perspectives 159 (Spring 1993) (suggesting that
economics students are more likely to engage in strategic behavior than noneconomists).
6 See generally Gary S. Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior (Chicago
1976).
' This question was anticipated in part in Mark Kelman, Comment on Hoffman and
Spitzer's Experimental Law and Economics, 85 Colum L Rev 1037, 1038-39 (1985) (sug-
gesting that "Coase Theorem advocates underestimate two phenomena that resemble, but
would not be helpfully thought of as, transaction costs": first, "any subjective aversion to
valuation or monetization of internal desires" and, second, "any aversion to the social
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take toward acrimony between parties, or toward norms and atti-
tudes that make them reluctant to bargain? The question is of
particular interest because it may bear on the relationship be-
tween the cases described here and the Coase theorem. Suppose
we regard enmity and a distaste for treating rights as commodi-
ties as transaction costs. Transaction costs in these nuisance
cases would then seem quite high, and in such circumstances the
Coase theorem would predict that the courts' judgments would
determine the final resting place of the rights-as seems to have
happened. But if those obstacles to bargaining are not considered
transaction costs, then perhaps the cases considered here are not
consistent with the Coase theorem after all: the courts' assign-
ments of rights were final, and if the lawyers are believed, this
would have been true no matter what the court had done-for
reasons that cannot be considered transaction costs. These con-
clusions would depend, of course, on which of the many available
definitions of the Coase theorem one is using, and this Article is
not the place to canvass those possibilities. The point for now is
only that the decision to classify certain obstacles to bargaining
as transaction costs has important implications from both a prac-
tical and theoretical standpoint. All of these are rich questions
that deserve a fuller treatment than can be given here, but a few
preliminary observations can be made about them.
The notion of "transaction costs" sometimes is used impre-
cisely, but generally it denotes either logistical obstacles or prob-
lems of strategic behavior that make it hard for parties to effec-
tuate their consent to a bargain that would make them both bet-
ter off." Whether a party is "better off" is measured, on this view,
by the party's own lights. That is why economic analysts prefer to
leave the allocation of rights to voluntary transactions wherever
they are feasible: a voluntary transaction requires the consent of
both sides, and their consent is proof that both sides consider
themselves better off as a result. In a case where transaction
costs are prohibitive, however, there may be a price at which both
sides would indeed want to make a trade, but they cannot dis-
cover the price and effectuate their consent because of coordina-
tion problems or strategic behavior by either side. Unrealized
gains from trade-and thus inefficiency-are the result.'
This notion of transaction costs has many applications. The
application of interest here is the one that bears on the selection
practice of bargaining or monetization of disputes-a reluctance to believe it is appropri-
ate to deal with friction between people on all occasions by explicit transfers").
See, for example, Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics at 100-02 (cited in note 12).
See Calabresi and Melamed, 85 Harv L Rev at 1106-07 (cited in note 2).
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of property rights and liability rules as remedies: the idea that
when transaction costs are high, the law should compensate by
placing rights where they would end up if transaction costs were
low-in other words, in the hands of whichever party would pay
the most for them. In this way the court makes both sides better
off by making the deal that they would make for themselves if
they could. Interesting difficulties arise, however, if we try to use
this model to make sense of the obstacles to bargaining the par-
ties encountered in the cases considered here. The difficulty in
these cases was not that the parties had trouble effectuating their
consent; rather, there was no consent to effectuate. The problems
the lawyers described arose from the content of the parties' pref-
erences-their opinions about one another or about bargaining.
Those difficulties, by themselves, would seem to provide no basis
for an award of damages on efficiency grounds; a court could not,
by awarding damages, have made the deal for the parties that
they would have made for themselves if they could, because they
did not want to make a deal. The impediments to bargaining re-
counted by the lawyers here were not transaction costs by con-
ventional definitions of that term.
Now those obstacles to bargaining-the parties' acrimony
and their attitudes toward bargaining-nonetheless could be
treated as transaction costs by the law. A pragmatic definition of
"transaction costs"-one based on the consequences of the term
for judicial purposes-is that they are impediments to bargaining
that should be regarded as bad, as "noise," as problems that
courts should help the parties overcome by putting the rights into
the hands of the party who would end up with them if only the
impediments weren't in the way. But which impediments to bar-
gaining are the bad kind? The answer to this question requires a
normative judgment from outside economics. For example, if an
economist suggests that a court should use damages as a remedy
when the parties to a lawsuit are too numerous for bargaining af-
ter judgment to be feasible, the implicit belief behind the sugges-
tion is that the parties' numerosity is interfering unhappily with
the expression of some baseline state of affairs-a world where
parties can bargain easily if that is what they want. But if one
prefers a different baseline, one can generate a different theory of
transaction costs.65 If our baseline were a world where people
have no racial biases, then racial biases in effect would become
For similar treatment of transaction costs as presenting a baseline problem, see
Jack M. Beermann and Joseph William Singer, Baseline Questions in Legal Reasoning:
The Example of Property in Jobs, 23 Ga L Rev 911, 956-61, 968-72 (1989).
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transaction costs: unfortunate impediments to bargains that oth-
erwise would maximize the parties' utility (or at least the sort of
utility the law is prepared to recognize). Racism would be an in-
stance of the dysfunction that it is part of the law's purpose to
help overcome.
Alternatively, if our baseline were a world not merely where
parties can bargain if they want to but where they want to bar-
gain wherever there is a pecuniary advantage to be had from do-
ing so, then their preferences for things other than cash would in
effect be treated as transaction costs.66 That is approximately the
approach required if acrimony and a distaste for bargaining are
to be regarded as transaction costs. The idea would be that one of
the parties really does value the rights more than the other, in
the sense that the party would have been willing to bid the most
for the rights if they were the subject of an auction. The impor-
tant thing is to get the rights into the hands of that party. The
fact that neither party would want to make a deal with the other
is beside the point; that aspect of the parties' preferences is noise
that prevents us from hearing the music of their true utility
schedules. On this view, then, law might be understood as a way
of reshaping the world to look the way it would not only if condi-
tions were different, but if people were different-if they had bet-
ter preferences, if they got along better, if norms were different.
Here the better preferences would be not those that flourish
merely when transaction costs are low, but rather those that
flourish when markets are strong-preferences that perhaps can
be shorthanded as the sort that corporations often are thought to
have: a willingness to bargain unencumbered by acrimony, emo-
tion, and a gut distaste for trading rights for cash in some con-
texts. I am not aware of any explicit champions of this view, but
it may have its inadvertent advocates.
The description just sketched treats the economic approach
to law as just one of a family of approaches that view law as an
instrument for making the world look the way it would without
certain regrettable features: a theory about what should be
counted by the law, and about what the law ought to help us
The relationship between these approaches was striking in one of the cases consid-
ered here (which I shall not identify). The lawyer for one of the parties said that the other
party was thought to be gay, and perhaps to have AIDS. Given the cultural context the
lawyer described, this stigma would have made bargaining between the parties impossible
to imagine. If a court thought this stigma was offensive to public policy, and that it was
the obstacle to bargaining after judgment (in the actual case, it was far from being the
only reason), there would be a strong argument for treating the stigma as a transaction
cost and awarding damages.
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overcome. In principle, the features the economist regrets and
wants to use the law to overcome usually are practical impedi-
ments to bargaining-transaction costs in the conventional sense.
In practice, if economists assume that people are interested in
bargaining to maximize the pecuniary payoff of a situation, they
are making an unspoken additional move toward the corporate
baseline-in other words, toward the use of economics to give the
world the shape it would have not only if conditions were differ-
ent but if people were different than sometimes they are. There
may be nothing wrong with such a move; in some instances it
may describe the world well, in which case it can be defended
with an appeal to the parties' consent (and has all the strengths
and weaknesses to which that defense is prone), whether the con-
sent is actual or hypothetical-but-plausible. But in situations
where people are not like that-situations where there appears to
be no consent to bargaining regardless of which way the court as-
signs the rights-the decision to imagine them with corporate
preferences requires a different defense. The usual justification of
the economist's view of transaction costs, which is that courts
should minimize or compensate for them because they are ob-
structing the parties' ability to make a deal, no longer is avail-
able. By assumption the parties do not want to make a deal; the
question is whether the reasons for this ought to be regarded-or
rather condemned-as transaction costs. The question might pos-
sibly be recast as whether people's departures from economic ra-
tionality ought to be treated as transaction costs. '"Might possi-
bly" because, as noted earlier, it is not necessarily clear whether
the parties to these cases were behaving irrationally in either an
economic or more conventional sense." "Ought to be treated" be-
cause deciding whether such departures are transaction costs in-
volves a normative decision about how the law should regard cer-
tain types of attitudes and behaviors, not a semantic or even a
strictly positive decision about the meaning of the words "trans-
action costs."
D. Particularism
As noted at the outset of this Article, nuisance cases have
taken on an expository significance that probably outruns most
analysts' actual interest in them. They are used as examples to
illustrate theories that are intended to have broad applicability.
That is their purpose in Coase's paper: Coase was using the cases
' See note 50.
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not because he particularly cared about nuisance law, but to il-
lustrate larger points about regulation and the consequences of
allocating rights in various ways. Others likewise have used nui-
sance cases as parables to illustrate their general views of when
courts should use property rights and liability rules as remedies.
So maybe it is of minor concern whether there are discrepancies
between what economists say will happen after nuisance cases
are over and what actually does happen. An alternative possibil-
ity, however, is that the poverty of the example has ominous im-
plications for the enterprise it is intended to serve. Here the en-
terprise is the creation of economic models applicable to a broad
range of legal problems. It is common for economic analysts of
remedies to theorize at a high level of generality, applying the
same model to diverse areas of law-to property and accident
law, for example, or to either of these areas and the law of intel-
lectual property." The power to generalize so aggressively is said
to be one of the attractive benefits offered by economic analysis.69
I suspect, however, that the economic analysis of remedies will
not become useful to courts and lawyers until scholars approach
the analytical project with greater particularity.
More particularity in the economic analysis of remedies may
show that some kinds of cases are more likely than others to re-
sult in bargaining after judgment. Certainly I do not mean to ar-
gue that nuisance cases are typical; they may well lie at the far
end of the spectrum of decisions subject to renegotiation by the
parties after a case is over-the end of the spectrum where such
bargaining is least likely. But we know little about the spectrum's
character. At the opposite end from nuisance cases may lie, for
example, trademark cases involving corporations; it seems plau-
sible to guess that substantial corporations behave differently
than individuals-that on account of their duty to maximize the
value of the corporation to shareholders (among other reasons),
corporate officers may be less affected by the difficulties encoun-
tered in the cases this Article considers. But perhaps those dis-
putes have their own sociology: their own unique pathologies or
, See, for example, Ayres and Talley, 104 Yale L J at 1092-97 (cited in note 3); Hoff-
man and Spitzer, 15 J Legal Stud at 163-70 (cited in note 4); Hoffman and Spitzer, 71
Wash U L Q at 104-06 (cited in note 39); Kaplow and Shavell, 109 Harv L Rev at 748-57
(cited in note 3). There are many instances, of course, where the applications of the Coase
theorem are more sensitive to the details of the context (though not necessarily the behav-
ioral context). For applications to real and intellectual property, respectively, see, for ex-
ample, Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 Colum L
Rev 2655 (1994); Stewart E. Sterk, Neighbors in American Land Law, 87 Colum L Rev 55,
85-88 (1987).
' Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 18, 272-73 (cited in note 12).
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other features that give bargaining after judgment (or before-
hand) its shape and make it either straightforward or problem-
atic. In all events, corporate trademark cases do not arise in the
same setting as nuisance cases; they do not involve one neigh-
bor's invasion of another's territory by conduct of an activity ob-
noxious to the senses, and thus they may not provoke the same
feelings and reactions or activate the same norms. They probably
require a separate analysis.
Greater particularity may also show that the source of a
right can affect how readily it is traded after its initial assign-
ment.0 One of the broader ideas in Coase's paper is that where
the legal system assigns rights and where the rights ultimately
wind up are different questions that may have little to do with
each other when transaction costs are low.7 But it may not be
useful for practical purposes to speak so broadly of "the legal sys-
tem" as the source of people's rights. Some of Coase's examples,
such as the nuisance cases, involve entitlements created by
courts. But his examples of liability for cattle trespassing onto
crops do not imply any particular source for the entitlements ex-
cept the government in a general sense; the rights may be created
by legislation.72 Subsequent writers have suggested that Coase's
point applies to entitlements created in any number of other
ways." Like writers who skip between different areas of law,
these writers skip between different ways that entitlements come
into being. Today a court (but it could have been a legislature or
an agency or a king) assigns an entitlement, and now the world is
the same as it was yesterday except with a different set of rights
for the parties to use as points of departure in their negotiations.
The important question is just whether there are practical im-
pediments to their bargaining. But the manner in which entitle-
ments are created may well affect how readily they are ex-
changed. If a system assigns rights by inviting the parties to
brawl for them, we might think twice before expecting to see
much negotiation between the parties after the brawling is over;
the litigation process can affect people's preferences, causing
them to think differently about each other and about their rights.
10 Compare George Loewenstein and Samuel Issacharoff, Source Dependence in the
Valuation of Objects, 7 J Behav Decision Making 157 (1994).
7' See Coase, 3 J L & Econ at 5-6, 10 (cited in note 1).
As is the case in Shasta County. See Ellickson, Order Without Law at 42-48 (cited in
note 4).
See, for example, the passage from Hoffman and Spitzer, 15 J Legal Stud at 151,
160 (cited in note 4), accompanying note 18. See also Polinsky, An Introduction to Law
and Economics (cited in note 13) (applying the Coase theorem to property, contract, and
tort disputes).
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The nuisance cases considered here are examples. When one
neighbor sues another, the stakes of their dispute change. Their
rights are going to be settled in an adversarial process where one
side will be vindicated and the other will be made a loser. Litiga-
tion to judgment, especially when combined with the other con-
textual considerations this Article has discussed, thus may be
likely to exacerbate ill will and foul the environment for bar-
gaining afterwards. And framing the issue in the suit as a ques-
tion of who has the rights may make it less likely that either side
will be interested in translating their interests into a cash offer or
demand: they never thought of themselves as being in it for the
money, and they don't want to be regarded that way by others.
Whether there is any better way to resolve nuisance cases is an
interesting question;74 the more general point, however, is that
we need not necessarily expect the same outcomes in contexts
where rights are assigned by legislative means that keep the
flame lower.
The same need for particularity may apply, finally, to cri-
tiques of economic analysis. If economic models have weaknesses,
then of course the important thing is to speak concretely about
what they fail to capture, and where. Again, I would hypothe-
size-cautiously, in view of the lack of data on the subject-that
the prickly preferences held by the parties to the cases considered
in this Article may be a more prominent feature of individuals'
behavior than of the behavior of substantial corporations,75 and
there may be other important distinctions of that sort to draw.
Are the norms and attitudes that may confound conventional
economic models the same in property disputes as in contract
disputes? Once parties have gotten themselves into a contractual
relationship and are trading entitlements for cash, perhaps the
"commodification ice" is broken and the obstacles to bargaining
after judgment found here fall away. Where businesses are in-
volved, does the type of corporation involved, or the industry con-
text in which it operates, make a difference? It may be dispiriting
to suppose that we need separate theories about behavior by cor-
porations and by individuals, about behavior in property disputes
and in contract disputes, or about behavior before judgment and
' On which see Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance
Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U Chi L Rev 681, 762-68 (1973).
7' Hoffman and Spitzer make this suggestion with respect to the endowment effect.
See 71 Wash U L Q at 109-11 (cited in note 39). See also Thomas F. Cotter, Pragmatism,
Economics, and the Droit Moral, 76 NC L Rev 1, 61-62 (1997). But see Thaler, Quasi Ra-
tional Economics at 185 (cited in note 40) (suggesting that the endowment effect may ap-
ply to firms as well as individuals).
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after judgment, and about behavior inside litigation and outside
litigation. But I suggest that we may well need all of those theo-
ries, and more, if we want to make usefully reliable statements
about how real parties are likely to behave under any of those
circumstances.
V. LIMITATIONS AND OBJECTIONS
I now consider some objections to the methods used in this
study and some limits on the conclusions that can be drawn from
it.
A. Cases Litigated to Judgment
This study might be said to suffer from a sampling bias: it
only considers cases that were litigated to final judgment. What
about the cases that settle? This is an important point, though
when framed as a sampling bias it reflects a misunderstanding of
the study and its conclusions. I am not purporting to ask or an-
swer any questions about what happens in cases that settle, so
excluding them is just a limitation on what the study means.
Cases litigated to judgment are, of course, only the tip of an ice-
berg consisting of all nuisance disputes, most of which are re-
solved without lawyers; some large proportion of the rest surely
are settled without filing suit, or without a trial, or without an
appeal. The tip probably is not representative of the berg: cases
where a court enters judgment may be the ones least likely ever
to involve bargaining between the parties; people who require a
court to resolve their problems with their neighbors may well
tend to be the ones most stubborn or hostile to the idea of bar-
gaining over the rights involved in the first place (indeed, the
lawyers occasionally described their clients as outliers in just this
way). So notwithstanding the references in the literature to post-
judgment bargaining in nuisance cases,76 it should not be terribly
"6 See, for example, Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics at 175-76 (cited in note 12)
(analyzing the Boomer case, where the court ordered a cement factory to compensate the
plaintiffs for the nuisance or face an injunction, in light of the parties' incentives to bar-
gain after judgment); Coursey, Hoffman, and Spitzer, 16 J Legal Stud at 235-36, 244 (cited
in note 4) (in small nuisance cases, "a court should choose legal remedies by presuming
that the parties can and will bargain efficiently," and in general "courts should choose le-
gal rights and remedies in many situations under a presumption that parties can and will
exhaust all gains from trade"); Krier and Schwab, 70 NYU L Rev at 453 n 46, 455 (cited in
note 3) (repeatedly discussing "post-judgment bargaining"); Polinsky, 32 Stan L Rev at
1092-1109 (cited in note 14) (generally discussing various factors that influence the likeli-
hood of bargaining after judgment); Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 80-81 (cited in
note 12) (analyzing the Boomer case in terms of the parties' likely behavior after judg-
ment).
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surprising that in cases that make it to final judgment-to the
bitter end, so to speak-the parties often will not be interested in
trying to bargain afterwards.
Perhaps discussions of nuisance remedies therefore ought to
be reoriented away from the analysis of bargaining after judg-
ment by the parties, and should be focused instead on ways that a
court's decisions affect settlement negotiations by parties who
come later. That is a promising idea, but such a move should be
made cautiously. First, we do not know anything about settle-
ment patterns in nuisance cases. We know some things about the
rates of settlement in civil litigation generally," but nothing
about whether nuisance cases, once they enter the court system,
settle as often as other kinds of cases do-as often as, say, auto
accident cases. Nuisance cases differ from most other tort cases in
a potentially important respect: in a typical tort suit the damage
has been done, leaving the plaintiff with nothing to do but seek
money; since the amount of money that will change hands is the
only question in the case, some of the obstacles to bargaining dis-
cussed in this Article will not arise. The reluctance to enter into a
transaction is not at issue. A transaction has been forced, and the
stage is set for bargaining over a dollar amount. That is not true
in a nuisance case. The plaintiff has hope of winning an injunc-
tion and avoiding a forced transaction altogether. This may result
in fewer cash bargains in nuisance suits than we see elsewhere,
since parties disinclined to trade their rights for cash are not
obliged to do so.
And in nuisance cases that are compromised, we know little
about the character of the bargaining and adjustments involved,
or about what influences those arrangements and to what de-
grees." Do the compromises involve exchanges of cash, or do they
involve noncash bargaining in the form of other adjustments the
parties can make (including unilateral adjustments by the defen-
dant just to be rid of the lawsuit)? When parties do hammer out a
compromise, how closely are they trying to predict what a court
would do if the case were litigated to judgment? Professor Ellick-
son has suggested that nuisance-type disputes between neighbors
often will be settled according to local norms without much refer-
See Marc Galanter and Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion and
Regulation of Settlements, 46 Stan L Rev 1339 (1994).
" For an interesting general discussion of settlement negotiation, see Samuel R. Gross
and Kent D. Syverud, Getting To No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection
of Cases for Trial, 90 Mich L Rev 319 (1991). See also Robert Cooter and Stephen Marks
with Robert Mnookin, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic
Behavior, 11 J Legal Stud 225 (1982).
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ence to law,79 and this no doubt is correct; those norms also may
figure prominently in the cases that settle after they fall into the
hands of lawyers, whose primary goal will be to come up with
some arrangement that both sides consider bearable. I am not
suggesting, of course, that nuisance cases never settle, or that
they never settle for cash, or that a court's decisions do not influ-
ence later settlements. I only am pointing out that we have little
information about these questions, and that their details may
bear critically on the reliability of predictive models. It is easy
enough to create assumptions about all of these matters, but then
it also has been easy enough to make assumptions about how
parties to nuisance cases that go to judgment behave afterwards.
B. Appealed Cases
There is another form of possible sampling bias in this study,
and this time the term potentially is apt: the study only includes
cases that generated opinions published on Westlaw or Lexis,
which usually meant cases that generated an appeal. It is possi-
ble that appealed cases tend to involve parties more stubborn
than those who accept the trial court's judgment without ap-
pealing; maybe the latter parties make the kinds of trades not
made by the parties in the cases I studied. 0 While I doubt this is
a strong source of bias (I doubt, in other words, that the difficul-
ties described by the attorneys in these cases are much less for-
midable in cases litigated to judgment but where no appeal is
taken), I cannot rule it out and therefore flag it for the reader.
C. The Courts Are Even Better Than We Thought
Another possible reading of the results of this study is that it
only shows courts are doing a perfect job by economic lights: they
are always assigning rights to the parties that value them the
most, thus obviating the need for any bargaining. (Or at least
courts are only using property rights to protect entitlements in
cases where the assignment of the entitlement seems efficient.) It
is important to tread carefully here, because there are many pos-
sible definitions of efficiency and they can cause confusion."' For
Ellickson, Order without Law at 270-75 (cited in note 4).
There is some discussion of this issue in Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behav-
ioral Economics, and the Law, 50 Stan L Rev 1551, 1571-72 (1998), and in Christine Jolls,
Cass R. Sunstein, and Richard Thaler, Theories and Tropes: A Reply to Posner and Kel-
man, 50 Stan L Rev 1593, 1603-04 (1998).
"1 See Lewis A. Kornhauser, A Guide to the Perplexed Claims of Efficiency in the Law,
8 Hofstra L Rev 591 (1980) (arguing that the various definitions of efficiency raise ques-
tions about the apparent simplicity of economic theories of law); Jules L. Coleman, Effi-
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example, one way to define efficiency is to say that an assignment
of rights is inefficient if it results in unexhausted gains from
trade.82 Given that definition, I agree that courts routinely make
efficient assignments of rights in these cases: there will be no un-
exhausted gains from trade no matter which way the court as-
signs the rights; regardless of who wins and loses, the price the
winner will demand to relinquish the rights usually will be more
than the price the loser is willing to pay. If the cases are under-
stood in this way, a court concerned about efficiency can relax.
Anything it does will be efficient, at least so far as the case at
hand is concerned; nothing it does will result in unrealized gains
from trade for the parties. Perhaps that is the best way to under-
stand these results. In order to be at odds with what I am saying,
by contrast, the criticism must be a claim that of the two general
ways a court can assign rights, one will be efficient and the other
will not be; that the courts in these cases assigned the rights effi-
ciently; and that if the courts here had not done so, the parties
would have bargained after judgment, or at least that bargaining
would not have been foreclosed by the obstacles described in this
Article. If this interpretation is correct, then the absence of bar-
gaining would show only that courts are skillful in awarding
property rights to whichever party would pay the most for them.
("The courts are even better than we thought," the economist
might say.)
I do not think the account just presented is a good descrip-
tion of how courts decide nuisance cases, but it will not be fruitful
to debate here whether judges try to award the rights in nuisance
cases to the party that would pay the most for them. For even if it
could be shown that courts do not make such assignments delib-
erately, one still could argue that courts sometimes do it inadver-
tently, and since we cannot know for sure when courts are doing
so, we cannot know whether and when the parties' failure to bar-
gain after judgment has any significance. But the suggestion of
this Article is not that parties fail to bargain regardless of
whether the courts assign the rights efficiently or inefficiently.
Rather, the suggestion is that this way of thinking about the as-
signment of rights-as "efficient or inefficient" in some helpful
sense-in fact is unhelpful here because "the party that would
have paid the most for the rights" is not as stable a concept as
economic models assume it to be. The parties' valuations depend
ciency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 Hofstra L Rev 509, 512-20 (1980) (offering four
different conceptions of efficiency).
See, for example, Hoffman and Spitzer, 15 J Legal Stud at 150 (cited in note 4).
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on the context in which they are asked for them (when, and by
whom, and for what purpose), and on which party was assigned
the rights in the first place.
Put differently, the criticism I describe would reflect a disa-
greement with (or disbelief of) what the lawyers said about their
cases. The lawyers said that the obstacles to bargaining that they
described would have foreclosed the possibility of negotiations
even if the rights had been assigned the other way. The critic I
anticipate would say the lawyers are mistaken or are trying to
give accounts of their cases that make themselves or their clients
look good; there would have been bargaining between their cli-
ents if the cases had been decided the other way. While conven-
tional transaction costs might have frustrated the process, the
critic would say, there at least would have been a will to bargain;
statements to the contrary by lawyers are just talk. I consider
this argument less plausible than the competing hypothesis-
that the lawyers accurately perceived and described their clients'
likely behavior. The dynamics of the cases here are foreign to
economic models, but are they foreign to human experience? If
two parties detest each other and would find a cash exchange
somewhat bizarre or offensive under the circumstances, it seems
reasonable to suppose that those considerations would make bar-
gaining after judgment unlikely regardless of what the court
does. This would be obvious if the cases involved requests for in-
junctions against protests outside abortion clinics: one would not
expect bargaining around the court's judgment, both because of
the parties' likely feelings toward each other and because of their
attitudes toward the rights at stake. Feuding neighbors are capa-
ble of developing broadly comparable attitudes. Or so their law-
yers say; but then what evidence is on the other side, militating
against the lawyers' accounts?
D. Conventional Transaction Costs
Another possible argument is that the real obstacles to bar-
gaining in these cases were conventional transaction costs: the
bilateral monopolies,83 freeloader and hold-out problems," and
private information85 that have been much discussed in the litera-
' See generally Landes and Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law at 45 (cited
in note 12); Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 68-70, 81 (cited in note 12).
See generally Calabresi and Melamed, 85 Harv L Rev at 1107-10, 1116-20 (cited in
note 2); Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 69 (cited in note 12).
' See Ayres and Talley, 104 Yale L J at 1027 (cited in note 3) (arguing that divided
entitlements can facilitate trade by inducing claim holders to reveal information); Joseph
Farrell, Information and the Coase Theorem, 1 J Econ Perspectives 113, 117-21 (1987).
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ture. The conventional transaction costs just enumerated essen-
tially are varieties of strategic behavior that tend to frustrate at-
tempts at bargaining. They do not seem prominent in these cases,
and were not the types of problems the lawyers described. Here
there were no attempts to bargain, and the lawyers generally did
not mention strategic behavior (or fear of it) as an impediment to
making a deal. 6
It is possible, of course, that if the obstacles to bargaining the
lawyers described had not been present, problems of strategic be-
havior would have come to the fore. In most of the cases it ap-
peared that if the parties wanted to make a deal it would not
have been difficult, but there were some cases where conventional
transaction costs loomed over the horizon. In Sharp v 251st Land-
fill, Inc, 7 for example-a case where residents won an injunction
against the creation of a landfill in their neighborhood-the land-
fill company might have been reluctant to try buying the rights
from the plaintiffs, since there might have remained a danger
that other neighbors would emerge later to complain about poten-
tial contamination of their water supply. They could have been
approached directly, but it might have been hard to obtain every-
one's agreement; some of residents might have held out. As it
happens, however, the negotiations appear to have been doomed
before those difficulties were encountered. The lawyers reported
that the parties were not interested in trying to make a deal, and
that this lack of interest was not related to coordination prob-
lems. (In cases where there were no such potential coordination
problems, there still was no bargaining, and for the same stated
reasons.)
A determined economist, of course, might nevertheless insist
that those potential transaction costs-eventual difficulties the
parties might have faced in enforcing whatever deal they made,
for example-were the true reasons for the absence of bargaining
in these cases. Even if the lawyers were speaking in earnest,
their accounts were just unconscious attempts to dress up hum-
drum practical problems of strategic behavior in the language of
principle and high drama. The difficulty with this analysis, as
with any theory of false consciousness, is that it is hard to falsify.
If the parties would not have bargained no matter how the rights
An exception is 44 Plaza, Inc v Gray-Pac Land Co, 845 SW2d 576, 577 (Mo App
1992) (discussed in text accompanying notes 112-13), involving the fireworks dealers: each
had a concern that the other could not be trusted to carry out promises. But that fear
seems not to have been the "but for" cause of the lack of bargaining, this was a case where
one of the parties tried to strangle the other.
925 P2d 546 (Okla 1996) (discussed at text accompanying notes 102-03).
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were allocated, then it was-perforce-a case of high transaction
costs, whether they realized it or not. This account does not seem
to me to be persuasive or useful, but it is hard to prove that it is
wrong.
E. There Still Could Have Been Bargaining After the Inquiries
It is always possible that the time frame of this Article was
too short: after the inquiries were complete, the parties may have
made a deal. This seems unlikely; some of the inquiries were
made a year or more after final judgment, and in general the
situations the lawyers described seemed settled. But in the end
this is another empirical question, and the possibility of some
later changes in the parties' positions cannot be ruled out.
F. The Parties Might Have Disagreed with Their Lawyers
It might be revealing to talk to the parties rather than their
attorneys. The accounts in this study in a sense are second-hand,
and it is possible that the lawyers portrayed their clients inaccu-
rately. Maybe they preferred to style their clients as people of
principle, when perhaps all they really were doing was setting
thestage for possible bargaining still to come. This seems doubt-
ful; usually the lawyers on both sides agreed in their descriptions
of both parties, and those descriptions were far from heroic-were
in fact unflattering to their own clients in many instances. Given
the consistency of the lawyers' accounts-within each case, where
it was possible to communicate with both lawyers, and from case
to case-I do not think the results would have been much differ-
ent if I had spoken with their clients.
It would be particularly interesting to know what role the
lawyers had in shaping their clients' views of their options, and
perhaps that is information that the lawyers themselves cannot
be expected to provide (though some of them did say they had
tried everything they could to get their clients to consider settle-
ment). It is conceivable that at least some of the absence of bar-
gaining results from the lawyers' influence, rather than any set-
tled opposition to bargaining by the parties. This raises a number
of interesting questions about the appropriate role of an attorney
in cases like these. If lawyers help shape their clients' attitudes
toward their rights and toward bargaining, should they be
pressing them to make deals by encouraging them to think of
their entitlements in commodified terms?
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
A study of twenty old-fashioned nuisance cases litigated to
judgment revealed no bargaining after judgment in any of them.
Nor did any of the lawyers contacted believe that bargaining after
judgment would have occurred if the loser had won. They attrib-
uted the lack of bargaining after judgment to acrimony between
the parties and to attitudes the parties held toward their rights
that made them reluctant to bargain. The size of the sample con-
sidered here is small, so it would not be wise to draw strong con-
clusions from these results about how nuisance cases ought to be
decided. We do not know just how often these sorts of problems-
of enmity and of resistance on various grounds to treating certain
rights as commodities-are sufficient to foreclose the possibility
of bargaining after judgment. But in view of the consistency of
the results recounted here, it does seem reasonable to conclude
that these problems often can be substantial impediments to bar-
gaining after judgment in nuisance cases. These difficulties gen-
erally have been overlooked in the economic literature, which
uses models of human behavior that focus instead on the danger
that each side will engage in strategic behavior that may derail
otherwise promising bargains.88 If a court deciding a nuisance
case were to base its decision on these models of nuisance litiga-
tion and its aftermath that have been offered in the economic lit-
erature, it thus would be acting hazardously; the models exclude
details that can have important practical consequences. Perhaps
courts understand this. It is not clear that economic models have
had an effect on the way that courts fashion remedies, at least in
this area of law. If the models have not had much effect, it may be
because judges can sense in them the absence of details that
make a difference.
These results raise a number of questions worthy of further
exploration. Why might parties have the attitudes toward cash
exchanges that the lawyers in these cases describe? To what ex-
tent do similar attitudes toward cash exchanges exist in other
nonmarket contexts? What stance should the law take toward the
For a partial exception, see Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics at 100-01 (cited in
note 12) (explaining that ambiguities in legal rights and the costs of monitoring any coop-
erative solution, as well as strategic behavior, are obstacles to successful bargaining).
These results bear only a surface resemblance to the "Hobbes theorem" proposed else-
where by Professor Cooter. See Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J Legal Stud 1, 18-23
(1982). The Hobbes theorem suggests that problems of strategic behavior will be insur-
mountable obstacles to the division of a surplus from bargaining. In the cases considered
here, the parties did not get far enough for strategic behavior to become a problem; per-
haps the problem with applying the Hobbes theorem here, then, is that it is too optimistic.
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parties' feelings in cases like these? A possible answer to the last
question is that acrimony and a distaste for treating rights as
commodities ought to be considered transaction costs. But the de-
cision to classify an aspect of human preference or behavior as a
"transaction cost" would have consequences of its own (it would
mean using the law to extinguish the effect of those preferences
and behaviors), and thus requires a defense. The behavior of the
parties to these cases might seem deviant if viewed relative to a
baseline of behavior by people inside markets, or behavior by cor-
porations that may not be susceptible to emotion, humiliation,
and other cognitive features of individual life outside of markets.
But why use that sort of behavior as the standard to which the
rest of the world should be brought into line? Maybe there are
normative or pragmatic arguments that could be advanced in
support of such a position; the point here, in any event, is just
that if a purpose of the law is to help make the world look the
way it would if bargaining were easy, then the ideas we use about
human attitudes and behavior in that setting ought to be made
explicit and properly defended.
Nuisance cases often involve situations where conventional
transaction costs are low, and the stories told about them thus
have served in some instances as sources of ideas about how the
law should handle the many situations where transaction costs
are prohibitive. One of the propositions to emerge from this lit-
erature is that where bargaining between legal actors is not fea-
sible as a practical matter, the law should try to recreate the out-
comes that would emerge if bargaining were easier. But if it
turns out that parties do not bargain over their rights when
transaction costs are low (or if we know they wouldn't because we
see them refusing to bargain for reasons that have nothing to do
with transaction costs in the sense of feasibility problems), then
the broad project of using law to create bargains for parties when
transaction costs are high becomes more complicated to defend.
The problem might be avoided by abandoning nuisance cases as a
paradigm-by finding some other situation where parties are
more inclined to bargain and saying that is the situation the law
should try to mimic when it confronts problems involving high
transaction costs. But that move, too, requires a defense. If the
law is going to be used to create the outcomes that would emerge
in a counterfactual world, we need to know not only what the
conditions are in that world, but what the people there are like,
and why they have been chosen as models. It is not as if the be-
havior and attitudes of the parties in these nuisance cases are ex-
ceptions to some general rule of human behavior. No general rule
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for these purposes has been established, either as an empirical or
normative matter.
In the meantime, however modest the sample and methodol-
ogy used here may be, I hope the accounts presented in this Arti-
cle will encourage a measure of caution on the part of economic
modelers who generalize about the consequences of using prop-
erty rights and liability rules as remedies. There is a parallel be-
tween the use of nuisance cases by economic analysts (including
Coase) and the use of lighthouses by economic analysts (criticized
by Coase). Coase undertook a study of the financing of light-
houses 9 in an attempt to show that the views of many economists
rested on examples that had weak and unexamined empirical
foundations. In particular, he was bothered by economists' use of
lighthouses as an example of a public good that private enterprise
cannot be counted upon to provide. What Coase says about the
use of lighthouses by some economists is not far from what I
would say about the use of nuisance cases by other economists:
Despite the extensive use of the lighthouse example in the
literature, no economist, to my knowledge, has ever made a
comprehensive study of lighthouse finance and administra-
tion. The lighthouse is simply plucked out of the air to serve
as an illustration. The purpose of the lighthouse example is
to provide 'corroborative detail, intended to give artistic veri-
similitude to an otherwise bald and unconvincing narrative.'
This seems to me to be the wrong approach. I think we
should try to develop generalizations which would give us
guidance as to how various activities should best be organ-
ized and financed. But such generalizations are not likely to
be helpful unless they are derived from studies of how such
activities are actually carried out within different institu-
tional frameworks. 0
APPENDIX
Hildebrand v Watts.91 Dominick DiMenco and his wife, Terry, lived next door to Carl
and Florence Hildebrand in New Castle, Delaware. 92 The DiMencos and the Hildebrands
do not get along well, and have litigated a number of their differences over the years. This
See Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler, 50 Stan L Rev at 1471, 1484, 1498 (cited in note 20).
R.H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J L & Econ 357, 375 (1974), quoting
William S. Gilbert, The Mikado.
" 1997 Del Ch LEXIS 32. This account is based on the opinion in the case and on
questionnaires filled out by the lawyers for both sides.
"The "Watts" in the case name is Lee Watts, the father of Terry DiMenco and part-
owner of the DiMencos' house; he has no other connection to the case. See id at *2.
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dispute involved a large light on top of the DiMencos' house. The DiMencos claimed that
they put the light there in order to protect their house against vandalism and theft (they
said they had been robbed of bicycles, a motor bike, and a car, and that the car was taken
from the part of their driveway where the light now shines). They also were concerned
about other thefts that had occurred in the neighborhood. In addition, they liked the light
because it permitted their children to play outside late in the day. The Hildebrands, how-
ever, complained that the light shined into their house-that it shined (as the court ex-
plained) "into their kitchen in the evenings, and is noticeable when the kitchen lights are
off, and shines into their bathroom, even though the venetian blinds are drawn so as to
block light from entering the room from outside."9 3 The Hildebrands believed that the
light was installed to spite them (the DiMencos had erected a large fence between the
neighbors' properties at about the same time as they installed the light). They said that
the DiMencos frequently flicked the light on and off just to harass them. The DiMencos
denied this. The Hildebrands offered photographs and a videotape to support their claims.
The chancery judge studied the evidence and concluded that "it is hard for me to agree,
based on what I saw, that [the light] is so blinding or obtrusive as to render the bathroom
and kitchen unusable to [the Hildebrands] in any realistic sense."94 The judge noted that
the light did frustrate Mr. Hildebrand's enjoyment of his back porch, but noted that the
problem had become less severe since the suit began: in the meantime the DiMencos had
installed some other, less intrusive lights intended to reduce the amount of time the big
light needed to be kept on.9 5 The judge concluded that without evidence of more substan-
tial discomfort (lost sleep, for example), he was not willing to enjoin the use of the light.
The DiMencos' use of the light has continued since the end of the lawsuit. There has
been no attempt to negotiate an arrangement in which the Hildebrands might pay the
DiMencos to remove the light or modify their use of it. The lawyers agreed on the reason
why: "[We] tried to get the parties to negotiate, but the parties hate each other." "The par-
ties do not get along. Every contact leads to further hostility." The lawyers also believed
that if the Hildebrands had won the suit, they would not have bargained with the DiMen-
cos to allow them to keep using the light. The DiMencos' lawyer said, "My experience in
these cases (in which the parties hate each other) is that they never get resolved. The only
solution is for one party, to move."
Kruger v Shramek.9 6 There is a subdivision in Omaha, Nebraska, called Eagle Run
West. Eric and Ann Kruger bought a lot there in 1991. John and Tammy Shramek bought
the neighboring lot about a year and a half later. The Krugers had not yet begun building
their house at the time, and soon the Shrameks overtook them, constructing a home and
landscaping their backyard. The Shrameks' landscaping aggrieved the Krugers, because
Eagle Run West is adjacent to the Champions Golf Course in Omaha, and the Shrameks'
landscaping obstructed the view of the 18th green from the patio that the Krugers had
planned to build. The Shrameks made some adjustments in response to the Krugers' com-
plaints, but the adjustments were not enough to suit the Krugers, who brought a lawsuit
seeking, among other things, an injunction requiring that their view be restored.9 7 The
trial court rejected these claims, and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that "a lawful
building or structure, including landscaping improvements associated with any such
building or structure, cannot be complained of as a private nuisance merely because it ob-
structs the view of neighboring property.9 s
Id at *12.
9' Id at *15.
The Hildebrands complained about one of these lights, too, but the court refused to
consider the claim. The DiMencos insisted that the light in question, attached to a shed in
their back yard, was activated by a motion sensor-which was why it created the flicker-
ing effect that vexed the Hildebrands.
' 5 Neb App 802, 565 NW2d 742 (1997). This account is based on the opinion in the
case and on questionnaires filled out by the lawyers for both sides.
' The Krugers also argued that the Shrameks were violating terms of restrictive
covenants they had signed, but the court rejected these claims.
9 565 NW2d at 747.
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Once the lawsuit settled the parties' rights, there was no exchange afterwards and no
discussion of the possibility of an exchange. -The parties weren't talking," the plaintiffs'
lawyer wrote. "Typical neighborhood dispute in which personalities get mixed in-the
transaction cost the Brits call bloody mindedness." Likewise, according to the defendants'
lawyer, 'The parties were so hostile that they could not agree on anything." The defen-
dants' lawyer also revealed that the plaintiff "is a practicing attorney in Omaha. Even
though he hired an attorney of record he was really his own attorney and he had a fool for
a client." Even if the court had found a nuisance and ordered the Shrameks' trees re-
moved, neither lawyer thought there would have been any bargaining over that order, ei-
ther.
Ritchhart v Gleason.99 Gary and Elaine Gleason owned a mobile home park in Ross
County, Ohio. It was wiped out by a flood. They received some money from FEMA and the
Small Business Administration to rebuild it elsewhere. They found a parcel of land that
seemed suitable, bought it, and started building. They borrowed $480,000 to purchase and
install a sewage treatment plant, obtained the necessary permits to operate it, and began
discharging effluent from the plant into a ditch-a ditch that ran across the property of
Wayne and Renick Ritchhart. The Ritchharts were worried that the effluent might settle
in the ditch (which otherwise was dry 90 percent of the year). They sued, claiming that the
effluent constituted a nuisance and a trespass and seeking an injunction against its fur-
ther discharge into the ditch. The trial court granted the injunction, and the court of ap-
peals affirmed.
Since the court entered judgment, the Gleasons have paid to have the waste from the
park trucked to a treatment facility elsewhere. The parties have not discussed the possi-
bility that the Gleasons could pay the Ritchharts for the right to discharge the effluent
into the ditch. The plaintiffs' lawyer said he did not know what would have happened if
the defendants had offered to buy the rights from the plaintiffs after the suit was over.
Such a possibility "never came up," and he had trouble imagining it. 'This came to be a
very emotional issue for the parties. It's hard for me to fathom a situation where the de-
fendants would write a check for anything to my clients." He said that "the defendants
had been counseled by their attorney that a state permit was all they needed, that [their
case was] a dead-bang winner. They claimed the original suit brought was frivolous," and
these charges caused both sides to dig in their heels.
Another problem was that the Gleasons never talked to the Ritchharts about their
plans; the Ritchharts' lawyer thought this also hurt the possibility of any negotiation after
judgment. 'The property owners were annoyed because [the defendants] could have asked.
Maybe a deal could have been more easily worked out in advance. But then the battle
lines were drawn." He said that if he had been counseling the defendants in advance, he
would have advised them to act differently. "Particularly in a rural community, you do the
neighborly thing and knock on doors and explain what you're going to do. I think it would
have made a big difference. Our clients weren't out to make a buck over the whole thing.
They were concerned about their rights." He thought that similar views about bargaining
were held on the other side, identifying two reasons why he thought there was no bar-
gaining. "One was principle; the other was finances. [The defendants] had put every nickel
they had into the park" and wouldn't have wanted to pay the plaintiffs for the right to use
the trench behind their property.
The Ritchharts' lawyer did not think there would have been any bargaining if the
Gleasons had won the case-that is, if the court had vindicated their right to discharge
waste into the ditch. "If [my clients] had lost, I don't see that they would have paid [the de-
fendants] to go away. The volume [of flow] was low enough that it wouldn't have made a
big difference to them."
McCombs u Joplin 66 Fairgrounds, Inc. This was a racetrack case arising in an un-
' 109 Ohio App 3d 652, 672 NE2d 1064 (1996). This account is based on the opinion in
the case, and on a questionnaire filled out by the plaintiffs' lawyer and a telephone inter-
view with him (Jan 20, 1998).
925 SW2d 946 (Mo App 1996). This account is based on the opinion in the case,
questionnaires filled out by lawyers for both sides, and a telephone interview with the de-
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zoned area on the outskirts of Joplin, Missouri. Joplin 66 bought a one hundred acre lot of
land there and built a dirt auto racetrack 3/8 of a mile long; the lawyer for the racetrack
estimated that it had cost approximately $1.5 million. On one side of the racetrack were
commercial and manufacturing buildings; on the other were houses, though the nearest
house was several hundred feet away. There were 46 houses within a half-mile of the race-
track, 301 within a mile of it, and a total of 2,762 residents living within a two-mile ra-
dius.
Before building the track, Joplin 66 sought a declaration that it would not be creating
a nuisance; the request was rejected as premature. Once the track was up and running,
twenty-eight residents from the surrounding area joined as plaintiffs in a lawsuit seeking
to enjoin the races as a nuisance. Joplin 66 offered to buy the houses closest to the track,
but an agreement could not be reached; the owners demanded premiums for their homes,
which the track would not pay.
The court granted the injunction in part, placing some restrictions on the noise and
dust the track would be allowed to generate and on the length and number of races the
track would be allowed to conduct. The court also required the racetrack to ensure that
the race cars were fitted with certain types of mufflers.
According to both lawyers, there have been no negotiations between the parties about
the possibility of modifying the court's order-no discussions of the possibility that the
residents might pay the racetrack to scale back its operations further or that the racetrack
might purchase permission to operate outside the restrictions imposed by the injunction.
The racetrack has not considered such possibilities, according to its lawyer, though "the
race track operator believes he has been unduly restricted and the owners are disap-
pointed because they didn't get it closed completely." The racetrack's lawyer did not be-
lieve there would have been any bargaining after judgment if the racetrack had won the
suit outright. While it seemed likely that the race cars might have installed the mufflers
without a court order (because other racetracks required the mufflers), he did not think
there would have been an offer to pay the track to operate less frequently. And he did not
think the residents could have afforded to buy out the racetrack altogether.
Nor did the defendant's lawyer believe there would have been bargaining if the race-
track's operation had been enjoined altogether. It was "an emotional kind of case" for the
residents who lived near the track, and he "guaranteed" that they would not have taken
money from the racetrack to allow it to operate if it had been enjoined. "Some of [the resi-
dents] were people of means," and "were at the stage of their lives where money isn't as
important as quality of life." And there were "hard feelings" besides: the racetrack's law-
yer said that if a broader injunction had been entered and affirmed, "I expect the owners
would have tried to think of something else offensive to do with the land." (They had
talked of starting a trailer park there if the racetrack were shut down.)
Slavant v Calhoun Motor Speedway.101 Yet another case about a racetrack. Thirty-
nine homeowners in Calhoun, Louisiana brought a nuisance suit against a local speedway.
The plaintiffs testified about the inconvenience and mental anguish they suffered as a re-
sult of the noise and dust the speedway created on Friday nights. There were traffic jams
leading to and from the speedway before and after the races; in addition to noise from the
races themselves, country and western music was broadcast over the speedway's public
address system. Some of the plaintiffs said that a "funnel cloud" of dust would originate on
the racetrack and then sweep across their property about two hundred feet away.
The trial court concluded that the speedway created dust and noise that materially
impaired the plaintiffs' enjoyment of their homes and issued an injunction that placed
various restrictions on how much of each the speedway could generate. Some of the re-
strictions tracked a local ordinance restricting noisemaking; the court created others from
scratch. (The court of appeals added awards of $1,000 apiece to the four plaintiffs living
closest to the racetrack to compensate them for past harm.) After judgment, the speedway
was sold to another operator. The new owner ran the racetrack for two summers, then
fendants' lawyer (Mar 13, 1998).
101626 S2d 771 (La App 1993). This account is based on the opinion in the case and
telephone interviews with the lawyers for the plaintiffs and the defendants (July 9, 1996).
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closed it down-due in part (the lawyers agreed) to the dogged efforts of the plaintiffs to
enforce the restrictions of the injunction by initiating contempt proceedings.
The racetrack's owners suggested the possibility of settlement both before and after
judgment. One of the couples expressed some willingness to go through with this if the
racetrack's owner were willing to buy their house and pay a premium: perhaps 20 percent
more than the house's market value. The racetrack's owner was not willing to consider
this, and the negotiations went no further. The other couple involved refused to consider
being bought out; they considered their house their "dream home." The husband was a fac-
tory worker, and his wife was a former secretary who had quit her job in order to raise
their daughters. They had moved to the country and built their house there; they had been
surprised when the racetrack was built without warning. 'That's how it started, and right
away they started hating each other," the plaintiffs' lawyer said. "A lot of personalities
came into play." The plaintiffs' lawyer said that his clients could not have afforded to pay
the speedway to scale back its operations if they had not obtained the injunction, and he
believed the plaintiffs would not have considered letting the racetrack pay to be free of the
injunction's terms. "They didn't want money. They wanted to get rid of the noise," the
speedway's lawyer said. The plaintiffs' attorney agreed. "We've got good old solid country
people out there. They don't care about the bucks too much," he said.
Sharp v 251st Street Landfill, Inc. 102 251st Street Landfill bought a 320-acre parcel of
land in Okmulgee County, Oklahoma with the intention of building a landfill there. Six
neighboring landowners brought a lawsuit seeking to enjoin creation of the landfill as an
anticipatory nuisance. They claimed that the landfill was likely to generate noxious fumes
and cause contamination of nearby ground and surface water. The plaintiffs won a pre-
liminary injunction against the creation of the landfill, then a permanent injunction. The
state supreme court affirmed: "given the demonstrated sensitivity of the water resources
in the area, and the probability operation of the proposed landfill would pollute the water
resources of at least some of the a4 pellees, we believe no reversible error occurred by the. ... . . 103-
grant of a permanent injunction.
The landfill has not been built, and there has been no discussion between the parties
of the possibility that the defendant might purchase the right to build the landfill after all.
The plaintiffs' lawyer said there was no point in such discussions because the parties
"were so far apart they had no interest in talking." There had been brief attempts at set-
tlement negotiations, but they had not been productive; the parties "said rude things to
each other and then left." When asked about the amount plaintiffs might have accepted to
allow the landfill to be built, the attorney did not know: there was "no real interest in de-
termining an amount." I asked whether it might not make sense for the plaintiffs to con-
sider bargaining over a possible division of the profits from the defendant's proposed land-
fill. The plaintiffs' lawyer said that "from some law and econ point of view, that's what the
rational solution would be, but perhaps because we're more primitive here, people were
taking a different conception of property rights-they just didn't want fumes and con-
tamination interfering with their property rights." He thought the landfill company took a
similar view: its owners felt entitled to use the land as they saw fit and would have
strongly resisted the idea of paying the plaintiffs beyond what they already had paid for
the site. The plaintiffs' lawyer also was sure that if the landfill company had won the case,
there would have been no discussion of the possibility that the plaintiffs might buy the
land or otherwise pay the company to build elsewhere, although some of the plaintiffs
might have moved away. "Negotiating as a concept didn't have much appeal," he said.
Parker v Ashford.104 William Parker bought fifteen acres of land in Shelby County,
Alabama in the early 1970s, and was living on them in 1994 when he bought an adjacent
parcel of twenty acres. He began to build a dirt racetrack on his new property. This upset
2925 P2d 546 (Okla 1996). This account is based on the opinion in the case and a
telephone interview with the plaintiffs' lawyer (Feb 12, 1998).
1
' Id at 556.
661 S2d 213 (Ala 1995). This account is based on the opinion in the case and on
telephone interviews with the lawyers for the plaintiffs (May 23, 1996) and defendant
(June 6, 1996).
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two groups of neighbors: a pair of couples who lived within one hundred feet of the race-
track and a group of between twenty and thirty others who lived in a housing development
between a mile and a mile and a half from Parker's property. One of the latter neighbors
was a flight instructor, and one of his students was a partner at what became the plain-
tiffs' law firm. The lawyer put together a lawsuit on behalf of the neighbors. The court
found that the racetrack would be a nuisance and entered an injunction against its con-
struction. It based this judgment primarily on testimony about the amount of noise, light,
and dust the track would create for the neighbors living immediately next door.
Before the suit was filed, the plaintiffs' attorney met with the neighbors, and then
went to Parker and made an offer to buy the land at a price that exceeded its market
value. He suggested that Parker could use the money to build the track elsewhere, and
that after buying the property the neighbors would be willing to dam it and turn it into a
lake. Parker said he wasn't interested. Auto racing was his hobby, and he had long wanted
to have a racetrack next to where he lived. Parker told the plaintiffs that if he couldn't
build a racetrack, he would sooner turn the land into a pigsty than sell it to them. (This
was a clue that-as the lawyers went on to say-Parker would not have sold the rights to
the plaintiffs if he had won the case.)
There never were any discussions-between the plaintiffs and Parker, or among the
plaintiffs, either before the litigation or after the injunction was obtained--of selling
Parker the right to build the track. One of the homeowners did say he would be willing to
sell his house to Parker, but for a price that Parker considered prohibitive. After judg-
ment, the land remained an empty crater, still owned by Parker.
The court did not discuss the dollars involved, but Parker's lawyer believed that the
racetrack would cost more than $100,000 to build; he did not know how profitable it would
have been. Although it would have been hard for Parker to afford to buy out the plaintiffs,
his lawyer said, Parker was simply not interested in paying anyone for what he considered
the exercise of his rights. The plaintiffs' lawyer agreed: if Parker had won, the only way to
stop him would have been to buy out his land, and the personalities involved would have
made it impossible. Parker hated the plaintiffs, and would not have accepted any amount
of money from them. On further reflection, however, the plaintiffs' lawyer supposed that if
he had won perhaps Parker would have accepted several million dollars to forego building
the racetrack, but he would not have accepted any amount that the plaintiffs would have
considered paying him.
O'Cain v O'Cain.10 5 The parties to this suit were family members in South Carolina-
most of them cousins, and most of them named O'Cain. The late Henry O'Cain left adja-
cent pieces of land to his two sons, Lever and Harold. The properties were roughly sepa-
rated by a road, but only roughly. At one point where the road departs from the boundary
line, the property owned by Harold's family is separated from the road by a strip of land,
about fifteen feet wide, belonging to Lever's family. This dispute primarily involved that
strip of land, but a bit of background is necessary before getting to that part of the story.
The facts are rather intricate. Before his death in 1991, Harold O'Cain leased a por-
tion of his property to some members of Lever's family for use in raising hogs; in return,
Lever's family gave Harold's family one hog per year. Once Harold died, his children
planned to divide the family property among themselves, and a dispute arose over
whether the members of Lever's family should be allowed to continue raising hogs on the
leased property. Lever's family suggested that Harold's family buy the strip of land at is-
sue in this case-the strip owned by Lever's family separating Harold's property from the
road.
The dispute turned ugly. Lever's family built a wire fence along the property line; the
fence obstructed driveways that connected the road to houses on Harold's land. Members
of Lever's family put cans, buckets, and a toilet tank on the fence posts. They also posted
signs displaying the ten commandments, "Entering Hell," and various unkind sayings
about Harold O'Cain's family.
- 322 SC 551, 473 SE2d 460 (1996). This account is based on the opinion in the case,
questionnaires filled out by the lawyers for both sides, and a telephone interview with the
lawyer for the Marion O'Cain family (Mar 12, 1998).
1999] Bargaining After Judgment 429
Finally, Lever's son, Marion, removed the family hogs from the land the family had
been leasing from Harold's family. Nobody in Harold's family had told Marion that he had
to do this, but Marion said that he saw it coming. He testified at trial that "I did not say a
word, 'cause I knowed what to do about them 'cause we had land to put them on, and
that's what I did when we got the line surveyed." When Marion said "we had land to put
them on," he meant that the hogs could be moved onto the strip of land his family owned
between the road and the houses where Harold's family lived. And that is what he did: he
put the hogs just inside the fence he had erected, in front of the homes where Harold's
family lived.
Harold's family sued Lever's family, claiming that the driveways should remain open
and that the hogs were a nuisance because they attracted flies and created pungent odors.
With respect to the driveways, the trial court found that Harold's family had a valid
easement; the court of appeals affirmed. As for the hogs, Marion O'Cain said that the rea-
sons for putting the hogs there were threefold: "to keep the grass and weeds down" on the
land; "for them to have some exercise and walk"; and "[ylou paying taxes on [the land] and
you got to use it for something." He further explained that other land on his property
would not be suitable for raising the hogs because the other areas already had "feeders
and concrete poured and wire there."
The Master in Equity, one 0. Davie Burgdorf, determined that the hogs were not a
nuisance because they "only adversely affected the aesthetics of the home." He did not
believe that moving the hogs had caused any actual increase in flies and odors. The court
of appeals disagreed, however, finding that "[tihe defendants have, indeed, placed 'the pig
in the parlor instead of the barnyard,'" and that "[a] person of ordinary tastes and suscep-
tibilities would clearly find such a situation objectionable."' 07 The court rejected the de-
fendants' claims that they had no better place to raise the hogs than in front of the plain-
tiffs' houses, and further noted that there was evidence that the defendants had been
acting maliciously, as the plaintiffs claimed. The court enjoined the placement of the hogs
in front of the Harold O'Cain family's homes.
There was no negotiation after judgment over the possibility of keeping the hogs in
front of the houses owned by Harold O'Cain's family; Lever's family just moved the hogs
further down the strip of land. Neither lawyer thought there would have been any bar-
gaining if the case had been decided in favor of the defendants, either. The issue ulti-
mately was made moot by the departure of Harold O'Cain's family (the parties who won
the suit) from the area. They now rent out the property for farming purposes, and have
brought another lawsuit against Lever O'Cain's family for defamation arising out of the
signs mentioned earlier. (The defendants' lawyer felt confident that this suit would not be
settled, either; at this writing, he was preparing a First Amendment defense for his cli-
ents.)
The lawyers for both sides said that they had tried their best to work out a settlement.
Indeed, Harold's family offered to give to Lever's family the land they had been leasing to
raise hogs in exchange for Lever's agreement to remove the hogs from in front of their
houses. The defendants' lawyer said: "The lawyer who represented [the plaintiffs] and my-
self have continuously made efforts to settle these cases but our clients simply refuse to do
anything that is suggested by the other side." The plaintiffs' lawyer concurred: "As to why
the defendants were unwilling to entertain any settlement offer, I feel that they were un-
educated and would not take the advice of their lawyer regarding the legal issues in-
volved. In addition, it became apparent that they felt that they could do anything with
their land without regard to the consequences to other adjacent landowners. They were
just very hardheaded about the entire matter and it became an emotional issue rather
than a legal or business decision."
Both lawyers considered the case atypically nasty. The defendants' lawyer wrote that
"[b]ecause this was a family dispute, there is a tremendous deal of animosity between my
clients and [the plaintiffs]." He also wrote, however, that "most property line disputes that
I have ever been involved in was [sic] a result of animosity between the parties involved. It
"This was the appellate court's statement of the Master's reasoning. 473 SE2d at 464.
1
. Id at 467.
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doesn't seem to matter whether those parties are family members or strangers but the
property line dispute solidified their feelings of dislike and/or hatred of the other party."
The plaintiffs' lawyer wrote that "[wie live in a predominantly rural and agricultural area.
We do not have county wide zoning and property rights are a 'hot issue." Nonetheless he
thought that "these defendants were rather unique in their views and that we could have
reached a settlement with just about anyone else."
Sedman v Rijdes.108 Charles and Ellen Sedman live in North Carolina; on their prop-
erty they have a collection of fruit trees. For several years they lived next to an organic
farmer who had a number of cypress trees on his property. These cypress trees conven-
iently shielded the Sedmans' property from Multiflora Greenhouses, Inc., a firm that
raises and sells plants and vegetables. However, Multiflora eventually bought the inter-
vening property and removed the cypress trees, leaving the Sedmans' property exposed to
the noise generated by thirty-seven large exhaust fans attached to Multiflora's building.
The Sedmans brought a lawsuit, raising nuisance claims and alleging zoning violations.
Before trial the parties went through a required mediation process; according to the
plaintiffs' lawyer, it did not help. From the point of view of his clients, Multiflora was not
willing to make sufficient accommodations. The Sedmans' lawyer said there were settle-
ment negotiations prior to judgment, but these discussions never involved a proposal that
the Sedmans would pay anything to Multiflora. Rather, the question was whether Multi-
flora would make unilateral accommodations to end the dispute. At one point Multiflora
suggested that it might buy the Sedmans' property: each side would obtain an appraisal,
and they would negotiate from there. The Sedmans decided that they didn't want to move
because they liked their trees and Mr. Sedman is emotionally attached to his property.
The trial court gave summary judgment to Multiflora on the zoning claims; the court
then submitted the nuisance claim to the jury. The Sedmans' lawyer felt he had a difficult
case because the noise from Multiflora's fans was "low frequency": it did not register sig-
nificantly in decibels but was the "kind of noise that will drive you crazy"; it caused the
Sedmans' windows to shake and their floor to vibrate. The jury found for Multiflora. The
Sedmans only appealed the judgment on the zoning claim; the court of appeals affirmed.
There have been no negotiations about the possibility that the Sedmans might pay
Multiflora to modify or replace the fans so that they make less noise, the Sedmans' goal in
the lawsuit. The Sedmans' lawyer believes such adjustments could be made, but that they
would be expensive and that his clients could not afford to pay Multiflora to make them.
If the Sedmans had obtained an injunction ordering the replacement or adjustment of
the fans, would the Sedmans have entertained offers from Multiflora to pay to be released
from the injunction? The defendants' lawyer said that although he didn't think an injunc-
tion would have resulted in payments by the defendants to the plaintiffs for the right to
continue running the noisy fans,,"a solution would have likely been negotiated to deal
with the worst elements of the adjoining use, and to limit its expansion." The Sedmans'
lawyer said no payments would have been made in that situation, and indeed no bar-
gaining at all. Why? For one thing, "they hate each other." For another, "the realities of
these situations are that you've got lots of feelings and circumstances that aren't neces-
sarily 'rational.' In this situation you've got years of bad blood, and nobody's going to be
able to put a price" on the rights involved. In addition, both sides have their "pride" on the
line; "each of them is feeling indignant and self-righteous." He characterized Multiflora's
owner as taking the position that "[bly God, this is my land, and you've got nothing to say
about it," and his own client's position as, "I've put all this into my property, and now
you're getting rich at the expense of your neighbors." The fans continue to blow.
Langan v Bellinger.109 Julie Langan and Ernest Eggers each own houses in Schoharie,
New York about 250 feet away from a Presbyterian church. They filed a complaint seeking
' 127 NC App 700, 492 SE2d 620 (1997). This account is based on the opinion in the
case, a questionmaire filled out by the defendants' lawyer, and a telephone interview with
the plaintiffs' lawyer (Mar 12, 1998).
'- 611 NYS2d 59, 203 AD2d 857, (1994). This account is based on the opinion in the
case, and telephone interviews with the plaintiffs' lawyer (May 24, 1996) and an assistant
to the defendant's lawyer (May 1, 1998).
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to enjoin the church "from playing hourly chimes on a daily basis beginning at 8:00 o'clock
in the forenoon and ending at 8:00 o'clock in the aftrnoon... and from playing carillon
music on a daily basis at 12:00 o'clock in the afternoon and at 6:00 o'clock in the after-
noon."
11 0 Langan alleged that the noise from the church "is a complete disruption of [her]
family life, prevents a child from sleeping, and invades the privacy of her] residence and
creates unnecessary stress."
111
While the church submitted numerous affidavits stating that the bells were not un-
usually loud, disruptive, or unlawful, the plaintiffs failed to submit any evidence other
than their own affidavits. The trial court gave summary judgment to the church, and the
court of appeals affirmed.
According to the plaintiffs' lawyer, the church had offered to settle the case prior to
litigation-not for cash, but by voluntarily ceasing to ring of the bells at certain times of
day. The plaintiffs did not accept the offer; nor did they offer money to the church to stop
ringing the bells, either before judgment or afterwards. The plaintiffs' lawyer did not
think that if his clients had won an injunction of some sort, the church would have paid
them for permission to ring the bells as before. "That never would have occurred, believe
me," he said.
44 Plaza, Inc v Gray-Pac Land Co." 2 A stretch of Interstate 44 in Franklin County,
Missouri, not far from St. Louis, runs through the city of Pacific, where the sale of fire-
works is legal. In 1989 a man named Brown, doing business as a company called 44 Plaza,
Inc., bought a large parcel of land just off the highway-roughly thirteen acres-for
$164,000, and built a store there to sell fireworks, beer, cigarettes, and gasoline year
round. The store made most of its money selling fireworks in the weeks before the Fourth
of July. A few months later a company called Gray-Pac Land Company-owned by people
named Kell--came along and bought, for about the same price, a much smaller piece of
land (a little less than an acre) immediately adjacent to the highway on one side and to 44
Plaza's store on the other. Gray-Pac only used the land for two or three weeks before the
Fourth of July, at which time it set up a large tent and sold fireworks. Early in its exis-
tence, Gray-Pac put up large signs advertising its fireworks, which had the happy (for
Gray-Pac) and indeed purposeful effect of blocking the view of 44 Plaza's store from the
highway. 44 Plaza sued Gray-Pac, claiming the signs were a nuisance.
The trial court ruled that Gray-Pac's signs were a nuisance because they were in-
stalled for "malicious purposes," namely to block the view of 44 Plaza's business from the
road. 1 3 The court of appeals reversed, holding that Gray-Pac had not infringed any rights
held by 44 Plaza and reasoning that a landowner has no right to a view of its property.
Rejecting the idea of liability for erection of a spite fence, the court refused to inquire into
the defendant's motives for committing a lawful act.
While the appeal was pending, Gray-Pac removed its signs (the only alternative was to
post a supersedeas bond that its lawyer described as prohibitively expensive, although he
could not remember its amount) and erected alternative obstructions. First Gray-Pac
added to its land a row of twenty-five tall (twenty foot) evergreen trees to obscure the view
of its competitor from the road. 44 Plaza obtained an order from the trial court requiring
that the trees be removed, pending the appeal. In response, Gray-Pac pulled down the
trees and hung from a crane a giant American flag, creating the same effect as the signs
and trees. Gray-Pac reasoned that a court would pause before ordering removal of a flag.
Before the court could reach that issue, however, the appellate court decided in favor of
Gray-Pac on the matter of the signs. So Gray-Pac took down the flag and put its signs
back up. (While the appeal was being decided, Gray-Pac had decided what to do if it lost
and was forced to take down its signs: it would set up a permanent building that would
have the same obstructive effects as the sign, and pay a girl to sit inside year round, per-
no 611 NYS2d at 59 (ellipses in original).
...Id at 59-60 (alteration in original).
1 845 SW2d 576 (Mo App 1992). This account is based on the opinion in the case and
telephone interviews with the lawyers for the plaintiffs (Aug 1996) and defendants (Aug
20, 1996).
. Id at 578.
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haps selling cigarettes. They reasoned that no court would dare shut down an operating
business as a spite fence.)
Following the appeals court ruling, Gray-Pac left its signs in place, even after the
fireworks season ended and its tent was gone, so that the view of 44 Plaza's store was ob-
structed year-round. 44 Plaza complained to the state highway department that Gray-
Pac's signs violated state law that permits only signs that advertise "on premises" sales.
During eleven months of the year Gray-Pac had no such "on premises" sales. Gray-Pac,
however, found a provision of the highway regulations defining "on premises" as "within
12 months"-and Gray-Pae's sales of fireworks never were more than 12 months away. So
the signs stayed up, and Gray-Pac prominently added the word "CLOSED" to them-pri-
marily to infuriate 44 Plaza by reminding them that the signs were serving no purpose
other than to block the view of its store from the highway. The signs also had the effect of
leading people to think that 44 Plaza's store was closed, since the signs were near 44
Plaza's store.
44 Plaza attempted to make itself visible using signs of its own; Gray-Pac, however,
moved its signs to compensate. A year or so later, Gray-Pac replaced its temporary tent
with a permanent store of its own to sell the usual roadside items. The building was a two-
story edifice smaller than 44 Plaza's. 44 Plaza responded by moving its gas pumps as close
as it lawfully could to its property line. This did not violate any laws, but it made it impos-
sible for Gray-Pac to renew its license to sell fireworks because the license would have
violated fire codes forbidding the sale of fireworks within 50 feet of gas pumps (as 44 Plaza
pointed out to the fire department). Gray-Pac obtained a variance from this provision
during the first year after the gas pumps were moved by promising not to keep any fire-
works in the back of its building. After that year no further waiver was available, how-
ever, so to avoid 44 Plaza's gas pumps, Gray-Pac tore down its building and moved it fur-
ther away at a cost that Gray-Pac's lawyer estimated to be about $100,000.
The lawyers said there were no settlement discussions that came close to succeeding.
Each side made early statements to the effect that they might be willing to buy out the
other, but neither was willing to consider being bought out. During the litigation, 44 Plaza
offered Gray-Pac about $300,000 for its land; similarly, Gray-Pac offered 44 Plaza between
$500,000 and $600,000 for its land and store. While Gray-Pac's offer seemed closer to be-
ing successful, it also contained a condition requiring that 44 Plaza not compete within a
mile or so of Gray-Pac's location. 44 Plaza said this was out of the question. The lawyers
conceded that there probably was some very large amount that 44 Plaza would have ac-
cepted to sign such an agreement, but Gray-Pac would not have paid it because it did not
trust 44 Plaza. Indeed, it worried that 44 Plaza might find some ruse-such as changing
its name--that would allow it to sneak back into the area.
The location at issue was important because fireworks were becoming harder to sell in
other towns in the vicinity (a nearby city had just banned them, causing another of Gray-
Pac's operations to close). Each side was afraid that if it relinquished its spot, it would be
hard to replace, particularly if it signed a noncompete agreement. It would amount to
selling the goose that laid the golden eggs," as one of the lawyers said, and the value of
the goose was too hard for the parties to estimate for either of them to want to sell. Gray-
Pac's lawyer said he was sure his client would have demanded a price somewhere in the
seven figures to give up its land, and 44 Plaza would not have considered paying such a
suM.
There never were any discussions of the possibility that 44 Plaza would pay Gray-Pac
to take down or move its signs, or for that matter the possibility that Gray-Pac would pay
44 Plaza to keep its gas pumps away from Gray-Pac's building so that Gray-Pac wouldn't
have to tear it down and rebuild. The lawyers laughed off the idea of such negotiations,
saying the chemistry between the parties would have made them impossible. They de-
scribed the parties as "hotheads" who could not be gotten into the same room together.
During trial, representatives of each party had indeed been left alone to try to work out
their differences; but Mr. Brown "went ballistic," and when the lawyers returned he had
Mr. Kell by the throat and was threatening to "pulverize" him. That member of the Kell
family died later in the year of other causes, but the incident left a bad taste in the
mouths of the surviving Kells.
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When I raised the possibility of a negotiation between the parties limited to the re-
moval or relocation of the trees and signs, the lawyer for 44 Plaza had this to say: "You
probably don't understand this if you've had no experience of how it is out in the country,
but when you get into boundary line disputes between people, I've seen cases where it was
a dispute over six one-hundredths of an acre, no more than a few hundred bucks worth of
land, and people fight over as if it were gold. There's something about property that seems
to bring out the worst in people." But the problem wasn't only that it was a property dis-
pute. He said that while the fireworks business "isn't quite like the mafia, it attracts
rogues." 114
Karpiak v Russo. The Russos ran a landscaping supply business. A group of their
neighbors, eight in all, brought a lawsuit complaining that the Russos' business was a
nuisance and violated local zoning ordinances. They were distressed by the noisy machin-
ery the business used to load its products onto trucks, by the odors created by the manure
and decaying mulch that the business sold, and by dust from bark, limestone, and topsoil
that blew onto their properties. The trial court dismissed the zoning complaints because
the plaintiffs had not properly notified the municipality of their action, and the court non-
suited the plaintiffs' nuisance claims on the ground that the harm they alleged was not se-
rious enough. Most of the plaintiffs worked away from home during most of the hours
when the landscaping business was open; most of them could not point to any quantifiable
damages they had suffered from its operation. There also were other businesses of other
kinds in the neighborhood, and the road where the business was located already carried
noisy traffic.
The plaintiffs' lawyer said there was no bargaining after judgment-no attempts by
the plaintiffs to make a deal with the Russos to move their business or change its manner
of operation. He said that one reason for the lack of interest in such bargaining was that
after pursuing the lawsuit, his clients were "at the end of their rope financially"; and he
expected that the defendants would have demanded an "unreasonable amount" to move.
But he also said that if his clients had won the case, he did not think they would have
bargained with the Russos. He said the plaintiffs and defendants had been fighting for
many years and characterized them as "the Hatfields and the McCoys." He said that his
clients were "uncompromising in wanting these people [the Russos] gone."
1 15
Gianoli v Pfleiderer.116 The Gianolis and Pfleiderers used to be neighbors. One of their
lesser ongoing disputes involved an easement over the Pfleiderers' lot for driveway pur-
poses. The Gianolis brought a lawsuit claiming that the Pfleiderers stored too many vehi-
cles on their property, interfering with the Gianolis' use of their driveway easement. The
trial court agreed, and entered an injunction limiting the number and type of cars the
Pfleiderers could store on their property. The court of appeals affirmed. More notably, the
case also involved successful claims by the Gianolis based on invasion of privacy and in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress. These claims were based on various unsavory ac-
tivities undertaken by the Pfleiderers: "stalking" the Gianolis, 117 interfering with the
Gianolis' attempt to refinance their home, and making obnoxious telephone calls to the
Gianolis. The court ordered the Pfleiderers to either pay the Gianolis $200,000 in punitive
11450 Pa Super 471, 676 A2d 270 (1996). This account is based on the opinion in the
case, and a telephone interview with the plaintiffs' lawyer (Feb 25, 1998).
" A year later, in a proceeding before the local zoning board, the plaintiffs finally suc-
ceeded in obtaining a ruling that the landscaping business violated local zoning laws. The
company was given a year to wrap up its operations at the site, and did so; in 1998 it
moved to elsewhere in the town. Ordinarily I did not consider cases that involved zoning
claims, because when a zoning claim is successful the municipality has an interest in its
enforcement and the defendant cannot bargain its way out of it by dealing with the plain-
tiff. This case was an exception because the nuisance claims were pressed and defeated
separately from the zoning claims, which did not succeed until they were litigated in a dif-
ferent forum two years later.
16209 Wis 2d 509, 563 NW2d 562 (Wis App 1997). This account is based on the opinion
in the case and a questionnaire filled out by the lawyer for the plaintiffs.
17563 NW2d at 566.
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damages or to sell their house and move away.
The Pfleiderers sold their house and moved away. Unsurprisingly in view of the par-
ties' bad feelings toward each other, there was no discussion after judgment of modifying
the court's order-for example, by arranging for a payment by the Pfleiderers to the
Gianolis of something less than $200,000 for the right to stay in their house. Because of
the "extreme animosity" between the parties, the Gianolis' lawyer said that no bargaining
was likely after judgment regardless of what the court said. "The parties had been
pushed-hard-by the trial judge to work out a solution by agreement," he said. "These ef-
forts came close-then failed." After this, 'there was no further attempt to negotiate. The
battle lines were drawn!"
Ross v Shpirt.118 The Shpirts bought a house next door to Ross. They began trying to
enlarge their house, but their work did not comply with various conditions that had been
set by the local property owners' association. The Shpirts demolished part of their house
(or perhaps inadvertently allowed a retaining wall to collapse) and allowed the property to
fall into a state of disrepair. Ross brought suit against the Shpirts on several grounds, in-
cluding the Shpirts' failure to comply with the association's conditions and some nuisance
claims.
The nuisance claim was based on the accumulation of garbage on the property, the
existence of garbage containers and portable toilets in front of the house, the presence of
construction materials, weeds, broken windows, and stagnant water on the property, and
construction noise from 7 a.m. until 6 p.m. Ross also alleged entitlement to an easement
"cosisting of an unobstructed view to the south and west of the Ross Property, i.e. of Lau-
rel Canyon and the City of Los Angeles."
119
On June 5, 1990, shortly after Ross had a meeting with the Shpirts about their pro-
posed construction, music was blasted from the Shpirts' property from 7 a.m. until 10 p.m.
at night. The music could be heard even with the windows closed. When Ross complained
to the Shpirts, they responded by adding a second radio on a property they owned on the
other side of Ross. The devices playing the music appeared to be on timers since they
started every morning at 7 a.m. Ross reported the disturbance to the police on more than
one occasion and asked the Shpirts to turn the volume down several times. He wrote a let-
ter to the Shpirts informing them that the music was "interfering with my sleep and
peaceful enjoyment of my premises[.]" He also obtained a temporary restraining order,
which the Shpirts ignored. The music playing ended sometime between the end of June
. . .. 120
and the early part of July, after Ross obtained a preliminary injunction.
Ross also attested to the general state of disrepair at the Shpirt premises and showed
pictures of construction debris, accumulated trash, overgrown weeds, and a partially de-
molished structure. Ross testified that he had "anxiety," when he viewed appellants'
house, and that he was "embarrassed" and "angry." He testified that it "affects [his] per-
sonality... it's like being forced to live next to a junkyard," and has "a radical effect on
[his] whole mental state every time [he] has to take a look at it and know what's gone on
and what [they]'ve gone through, and what it appears [they] will have to continue to go
through for God knows how long." He referred to the inability of being able to use his back
yard or entertain because of the mosquitos, and the "whole anxious, irritating mental
state" that "goes along with having to view it and see it.... You can't miss it, so it's a con-
stant source of aggravation and embarrassment and humiliation of unnecessary explana-
" 59 Cal App 4th 885, 69 Cal Rptr 2d 521 (1997). This account is based on the opinion
in the case, and on telephone interviews with the lawyers for the plaintiffs and the defen-
dants (June 10, 1998).
1-69 Cal Rptr 2d at 524. The homeowner's association also sued the Shpirts, but that
part of the case was settled before trial. "Under the agreement, the Shpirts agreed to pay
the sum of $35,000 to [the association] for failure to maintain their property in neat, clean,
and good order, and [the association] stipulated to waive its right to file a motion for at-
torney fees and dismissed its own claim for breach of contract. [The association] stayed in
the case for the purpose of being bound by any judgment issued by the court as to injunc-
tive relief." Id.
"'Id at 524-25.
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tion to both new friends and old."
12
'
The court ordered the Shpirts not to engage in further construction without approval
from the homeowner's association. The Shpirts were further "enjoined and directed to
clear and render the Shpirt Property in neat and clean condition, within 90 days, and to
maintain the Shpirt Property in a neat and clean condition thereafter." 2 2 The court of ap-
peals affirmed.
The Shpirts' lawyers said there were no negotiations after the court's decision about
the possibility that the Shpirts might pay Ross to be free of the injunction's requirements.
"Mr. Ross was just hell-bent on fighting every little thing," one of the Shpirts' lawyers
said. But he didn't think there would have been any bargaining if the Shpirts had won the
right to leave their house in the condition that bothered Ross. "There's just a lot of hostil-
ity between the neighbors," the lawyer said, and it foreclosed the possibility of bargaining
either way. "Before the suit there were some discussions [of settlement without litigation],
but they didn't go anywhere," he said. Ross's lawyer concurred: "the parties really don't
like each other," he said; he thought that on account of the "animosity" between the par-
ties, there would have been no bargaining over the nuisance aspects of the case no matter
which way the court decided it. He noted that there had been some attempts at bargaining
over other aspects of the case, but again agreed that they had not amounted to anything.
One of Ross's complaints was that the Shpirts' improvements would obstruct a pleasing
view from his house. At one point the Shpirts offered to pay for changes in Ross's house so
that the view would be preserved out of a new window elsewhere. The Rosses declined;
"they liked their house the way it was," their lawyer said. The bank ultimately foreclosed
on the Shpirts' house.123
Miller v Horn. In 1957, Ann Horn and her husband, David, purchased some real es-
tate in Clark County, Missouri. A year later, Ray Miller and his wife bought some prop-
erty next door. Soon the Horns began taking in and caring for stray animals; they also es-
tablished a pet cemetery on several acres behind their house. In 1973 the Horns bought an
adjacent property and moved there, turning their previous house into a sanctuary for
homeless animals and a kennel for cats, the Kozy Kat Motel. After Mr. Horn died in 1991,
Mrs. Horn continued this occupation, to the consternation of the Millers.
The Millers complained about the odors and noise emanating from the Horns' opera-
tion for many years. They had asked the local prosecutor to investigate the possibility that
the kennel and cemetery violated zoning ordinances, but the prosecutor's office would not
pursue the claim, and the local zoning board eventually ruled that the Horns' use of their
premises was lawful because it was established prior to the zoning of the area as residen-
tial in 1964. In 1993, the Millers brought a lawsuit to enjoin the keeping of dogs and cats
on Mrs. Horn's premises. Some other families in the neighborhood (seven to ten of them,
the plaintiffs' lawyer estimated) joined as plaintiffs, though the Millers were the driving
force behind the suit. The trial court found a nuisance and granted the injunction, order-
ing Mrs. Horn to remove all dogs, cats, and manure piles from her property. The court of
appeals considered this a "draconian" remedy, however, and remanded for entry of an in-
junction that would give Mrs. Horn a reasonable amount of time to get rid of the animals
and would allow her to keep a reasonable number of them as personal pets.12 4 The trial
court entered an elaborate revised injunction, this time allowing Mrs. Horn to keep a cer-
tain number of dogs and cats but regulating the amount of time they could be allowed out-
side, requiring her to take various steps with respect to waste the animals created, and
requiring her to remove all visible markers in the pet cemetery and close off public access
toit.
The lawyer for the plaintiffs said the Millers enforced the injunction, and that they did
not discuss the possibility of selling to Mrs. Horn the right to continue operating the ken-
nel and cemetery. Nor was there any possibility that Mrs. Horn might buy the Millers'
l Id.
Id at 526.
1996 Ohio App LEXIS 2678. This account is based on the opinion in the case, and on
a telephone interview with the lawyer for the plaintiffs (Feb 11, 1998).4Id at *17.
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house; it was worth between $100,000 and $200,000, and the plaintiffs' attorney doubted
that Mrs. Horn had more than $5,000 to her name. He also said he was sure that if Mrs.
Horn had won, there would have been no discussion of the possibility that the plaintiffs
might have paid her to close the operation down. "This lady was so eccentric; animals were
more important to her than humans. No amount of money would have been enough to get
her to stop." And only "in jest" had the plaintiffs ever discussed the idea of buying Mrs.
Horn's property. (Mrs. Horn's will apparently leaves her property to the local animal
rights league.) The other major obstacle to a bargain was the bad blood that had developed
between the parties over the years. "She thumbed her nose at the neighbors" and sug-
gested that they should move if they didn't like the kennel, the lawyer said. "There were a
lot of emotions involved, a lot of ill will." In the later years of the dispute, Mrs. Horn had a
hearing aid, and her response when neighbors complained was "to turn it off and flip 'em
the bird."
